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Testing the European Dream: Social Ideals and Cultural Realities in a Unified Europe 
 
This paper addresses the viability of the European Dream proposed by Jeremy Rifkin 
through an examination of the tension resulting from cross-cultural acts of violence. Using 
primary sources and reactions to these events in the press, I show the inadequacy of 
Rifkin’s theory to address certain aspects of European reality. Centering on the case of 
Germany, I then explore depictions of the European Dream and of the obstacles faced by 
non-Germans in pursuing that dream in a variety of texts by immigrant and minority 
authors. These case studies enable a closer inquiry into the structural flaws, the theoretical 
and practical accessibility, and the reality of the European Dream. 
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 3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This thesis is a reflection of the American Dream. It is the result of the opportunity and 
the freedom to pursue my ideas, of my work ethic, of my faith in the individual mind and 
in its potential for advancement. In the same measure that this paper is a product of the 
American Dream, so is the United States. For more than two centuries, the American 
Dream has been one of the great driving forces behind all manner of advancements, 
discoveries, and migrations. However, in recent years, increasingly disparate wealth 
distribution, economic recessions, and globalization (among other factors) have worn away 
some of the polish from the American Dream. The promise of unlimited opportunity, of 
economic advancement, of personal freedom, individualism, and, theoretically at least, of 
equality for all has become less possible and less believable. The result has been a backlash 
against globalization and cultural imperialism – even from beneficiaries of the American 
Dream itself. This leads inevitably to the idea that the American Dream is no longer 
effective, and that the time has come to look for alternative dreams. 
 Among those who believe the American Dream to be a destructive, unsustainable, 
and exploitative force is Jeremy Rifkin. He sees it as inherently incapable of carrying the 
world, or even the American people, through the next century. He is not, however, 
predicting the fall of modern civilization. Rather, Rifkin places his hope for the future in 
his notion of a dream which stems from the European way of life. He explores this idea in 
his recent book, The European Dream, in which he sets up the European Dream in 
opposition to the American Dream. The European Dream is the goal that drives 
Europeans, that lies at the heart of efforts of the European Union, and which entices 
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foreign citizens to immigrate to Europe in record numbers. Unlike the American Dream, 
with its focus on the individual, on the accumulation of wealth and property, on unlimited 
advancement, on a Protestant work ethic, and on assimilation, the European Dream as 
Rifkin describes it is focused on community, quality of life, sustainable development, 
human rights, and cultural diversity.  
Rifkin’s book loudly challenges common goals, lifestyles, and self-images of 
Americans. It has received a great deal of press since its publication, mostly in the book 
review sections of those publications with strong political leanings. Depending on their 
direction, its author, Jeremy Rifkin, has been hailed and condemned for his critical stance 
toward the American Dream. Most reviewers, if they read beyond the book’s subtitle, focus 
on the author’s critical stance toward America and on the how and why of the apparently 
inevitable failure of the American Dream. Less attention has been paid to Rifkin’s 
depiction of the European Dream and its potential as our ideological salvation in the 
twenty-first century. Rifkin’s idea of a European Dream is certainly intriguing, but just how 
realistic or feasible is that idea?  
 It is this question which I will pursue in this thesis. I will ask whether the European 
Dream is truly realistic and feasible enough to replace the American Dream as one of the 
primary motive forces in the world, or, for the matter, in Europe. I will attempt to answer 
this question along a number of different lines of inquiry. I will first examine the internal 
structure of Rifkin’s proposal and the relationships between its fundamental principles. I 
will also examine the appeal such a dream holds, because the feasibility of a dream is 
nothing if no one wishes to pursue it. Finally, since the American Dream moved such large 
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numbers of people and held appeal beyond the borders of the United States, I will pay 
special attention to the allure the European Dream seems to have for non-Europeans and 
immigrants.  
The structure and nature of Rifkin’s proposal is best understood by testing it in the 
context of European reality – particularly as that reality has evolved through the widespread 
immigration that has changed the face of Europe over the last several decades. To this end, 
I will explore the ways in which Rifkin’s theory explains – or fails to explain – cross-cultural 
acts of violence as a part of European reality, focusing primarily on journalistic 
documentation of such violence. The reactions to these events by cultural critics also 
illuminate the relevance of the European Dream for European life. Lastly, I will explore 
depictions of the European Dream and of the obstacles faced by non-Germans in pursuing 
that dream in a variety of texts by immigrant and minority authors. Two issues immediately 
reveal themselves to be of primary concern: first, the relationships between the building 
blocks or foundational ideas of the European Dream, and secondly, the relationship 
between the dream and those in pursuit of it. These issues lead to an investigation of 
identity, multiculturalism, and conflict, as both problematic elements of European reality 
and critical flaws in the European Dream. 
 As will become clear, a key issue for the validity of Rifkin’s argument is what might 
be called the “location” of the European Dream. Does the European Dream have a locus? 
If so, where is it and what are its boundaries? If the dream is necessarily located within 
European territory, thought, or identity, then only by buying into that thought or identity 
and by living within that territory can the dream reasonably be pursued. Rifkin does not 
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admit this to be the case. However, his conception of the European Dream entails what he 
calls “embeddedness” in economic, social, and cultural “networks,” which appears to have 
consequences Rifkin seems unwilling to recognize. As I will show, gaining access to or 
embedding oneself in a network entails empathizing with members of that network. And 
empathizing requires a certain identification with the recipient of the empathy. Thus, if the 
European Dream is necessarily located within a distinctly European network, it is 
reasonable to draw a connection between pursuing the European Dream and pursuing a 
European identity.  
This is an issue that will be discussed at length in the final chapter, which looks 
closely at texts and films by minority or immigrant authors. Cultural minorities in Europe 
are faced with a catalogue of issues which may hinder their progress toward the European 
Dream, including conflicting sources of cultural identity, the feasibility or necessity of 
assimilation, and the problem of networks so thoroughly different that they seem to be 
mutually exclusive. The difficulty posed by such problems is reflected most clearly in the 
challenge of moving between or switching networks. These issues also give rise to the 
problem of true identity or the obstacle of authenticity: if identity shifts and changes based 
on the network in which one is embedded, is that identity real and whole? Rifkin’s 
conception of networks is based primarily on mutual trust and solidarity. But because of 
the nature of cultural networks, especially in light of Rifkin’s insistence on preservation of 
cultural identity, it seems impossible for an individual to move freely between networks 
and to maintain a single, true, wholly authentic identity in every network. Instead, 
individuals may find themselves shifting identities to adjust to their current network. 
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While this allows a greater degree of freedom, it would seem contrary to the trust and 
solidarity on which the network system is based. This will prove to be an issue for anyone 
pursuing the European Dream. Essentially, Rifkin asks minority cultures to perform the 
contradiction of preserving their cultural identities while taking on European conceptions 
of freedom, fundamental rights, etc. In the meantime, he makes relatively few demands of 
the dominant culture or network. This is significant because it undermines Rifkin’s claim 
that the European Dream is the vision of the future and the best system for coping with an 
increasingly globalized world. 
While writing this thesis, I have attempted to address Rifkin’s theory with regard to 
the future of Europe and its dream rather than his doomsday predictions about the end of 
the American Dream. I have also attempted to avoid the pitfalls of my perspective as a 
believer in the American Dream and a member of a dominant cultural network. It is easy 
to criticize an ideal. It is my hope, however, that this thesis will do more than rain on 
Rifkin’s utopic parade. While the European Dream may prove to be inaccessible and 
unrealistic, perhaps there is a dream which truly is moving the continent and the people 
on it.  
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II. The European Dream 
 
In The European Dream, Jeremy Rifkin presents what seems to be little more than the 
opposite of the American Dream. He describes the European Dream as an idealistic, 
socially sustainable “vision of the future.” Not only is the European Dream apparently the 
way of the future, it has already begun to “quietly eclipse the American Dream.” 
Essentially, he gives us the key to socialist living in a globalized era which simultaneously 
nurtures the development of the European Union and is embodied in its ideal principles.  
 The book is more than a political statement; it is a proposal for the way 
governments, communities, cultures and individuals should interact in order to best cope 
with globalization. Rifkin goes deeper than state socialism: he lays out the workings of the 
kind of carefully balanced society necessary to support the style of government proposed, 
which is itself one of the supporting pillars of that society. The European Dream can seem 
like a relatively straightforward, if liberal, ideal way of life:  
 
[it] emphasizes community relationships over individual 
autonomy, cultural diversity over assimilation, quality of life 
over the accumulation of wealth, sustainable development 
over unlimited material growth, deep play over unrelenting 
toil, universal human rights and the rights of nature to 
property rights, and global cooperation over the unilateral 
exercise of power.1  
 
Boiled down to the most general, basic concepts, these touchstones of the 
European Dream (and antitheses of the American Dream) reflect the necessity of 
interdependence, multiculturalism, quality of life, and sustainable development 
                                                 
1  Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the 
American Dream (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2004) 434, p. 3. 
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economically, socially, and culturally. A dream based on such principles seems like it would 
be not only difficult to achieve, but also difficult to pursue. One is faced with the extreme 
difficulty of supplanting the individual with the “good of the community” even when the 
individual may suffer for that good. Most Americans would certainly object to replacing 
individual autonomy with community relationships and responsibility in their hierarchy of 
values. Europeans, however, simply do not have the same faith in the individual as 
Americans do.2 Rifkin believes that European optimism about the importance of 
community has been shaped in large part by the history of the continent, beginning with 
feudal castles.3 While many Americans fail to see a distinction between quality of life and 
accumulation of wealth and consider the accumulation of wealth to be an important 
avenue to a higher quality of life, Europeans often fail to see how quality of life can be 
separated from the welfare of the community.4 According to Rifkin, it is this sort of value 
difference that separates American thought from European thought, and the two different 
schools of thought which produce and are products of the dreams discussed here. 
One of the most fundamental differences between the European and American 
dreams is the absolute dichotomy separating their respective conceptions of freedom and 
security. Americans, Rifkin argues, see freedom as autonomy: “if one is autonomous, one is 
not dependent on others or vulnerable to circumstances outside one’s control.”5 To be 
independent and invulnerable is to be secure. This American variety of freedom is 
attainable through the acquisition of property and wealth, which itself provides 
                                                 
2 Rifkin, Dream, p. 327. 
3 Rifkin, Dream, p. 90. 
4 Rifkin, Dream, p. 83. 
5 Rifkin, Dream, p. 13. 
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exclusivity.6  It is the pursuit of this freedom and the accompanying autonomy, 
independence, wealth, and exclusivity that defines the American dream. Americans have 
officially claimed the pursuit of this dream as a right – to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness – since the earliest stages of the nation in the Declaration of Independence.   
That the European Dream is premised on a European conception of freedom is not 
a small thing. Rifkin claims that the uniquely European conception of freedom evident in 
everything from European history to cell phone trends to transnational economic practices 
is unequivocally grounded not in autonomy, but in what he refers to as “embeddedness.”7 
What Rifkin seems to mean by “freedom in embeddedness” is that European freedom 
comes from having a sort of generally secure position which is held secure by its myriad 
connections with other secure positions. These positions, whether social, economic, or 
cultural, form a kind of web or network. It is, then, by embedding oneself in such a 
network and being interdependent with several others that one is free. While the network 
can help protect a position against circumstances outside one’s control, it is oriented 
toward European-style freedom of access. Inclusiveness is key to this conception of 
freedom; where the American version depends on exclusiveness, the European Dream 
relies on inclusive relationships between individuals, communities, and networks to ensure 
security.  
Rifkin applies what he calls the deathbed test to the American and European 
freedom ideals: if real freedom, as a measure of a life, is the “power to experience the full 
                                                 
6 Rifkin, Dream, p. 13.  
7 Rifkin, Dream, p. 13. 
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potential of one’s being in the world,”8 all we have to do is choose which approach will 
help us best experience our potential as living beings to the fullest. Unsurprisingly, Rifkin 
sees European freedom winning out.  He believes that a life spent pursuing relationships 
has been better used than a life spent pursuing material wealth and autonomy. This is 
because more relationships grant access to more communities, and “the more communities 
one has access to, the more options and choices one has for living a full and meaningful 
life.9” 
Personal value judgments aside, it is important to remember that Rifkin is 
presenting ideals rather than realities; there will always be circumstances outside one’s 
control which cannot be protected against either by wealth or by connections. As ideals, 
however, the American and European conceptions of freedom speak volumes about the 
dreams they inspire. And it is the pursuit of the European Dream which, in Rifkin’s 
opinion, ought to shape the future. Rifkin emphasizes that the actual achievement of a 
dream is less the point than the articulation of that dream as something to work toward.10   
Rifkin’s delineation of the European Dream sets up several goals11 which are 
inextricably bound to the European conception of freedom. Although it may seem initially 
logical, it soon becomes evident that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish whether 
a particular ideal of the European Dream supports or is itself supported by that European 
freedom ideal. Furthermore, these tenets of the European Dream are all tied up in one 
another, making it equally difficult to analyze a particular aspect of the European Dream 
                                                 
8 Rifkin, Dream, p. 192. 
9 Rifkin, Dream, p. 13.  
10 Rifkin, Dream, p. 15.  
11 Community relationships, cultural diversity, quality of life, sustainable development, deep play, universal 
human rights and the rights of nature, and global cooperation. 
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independently of the others. Given the tangled nature of the dream’s pillars, two issues 
require a closer look. First, can these distinct ideals combine as seamlessly as Rifkin 
believes to form a coherent, cohesive, and relevant dream? Secondly, is the tightly knit 
interdependency of the European Dream’s pillars, not to mention the social structure 
Rifkin proposes, really conducive to the inclusiveness the dream requires? Is the dream 
intellectually accessible? This last question is particularly important to address. The 
accessibility of the dream in terms of individual thought says a great deal about Rifkin’s 
primary claim (and subtitle) that the European Dream is a vision for the future and is 
eclipsing the American Dream. If the European Dream is based on European thought, the 
adoption of the dream by non-Europeans may indicate an adoption of European thought. 
At the very least, it would seem that in order for the European Dream to live up to Rifkin’s 
claims, there must be at least one building block which could function as a sort of 
theoretical gateway to the structure of ideals (Rifkin’s castle in the clouds). Can the dream 
be approached from outside European thought? Does adopting it as a goal necessarily 
entail adopting a European perspective, set of values, or way of life?  
The European Dream is focused on sustainable development. This is not limited to 
the specifically environmental sense of development that can be sustained indefinitely by 
renewable natural resources. Rifkin intends sustainable development environmentally as 
well as economically, socially, and politically. Europeans agree; he cites the European 
Commission12 measures of quality of life and happiness (among others) by an economy 
that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
                                                 
12 “Our Common Future.” World Commission on Environment and Development. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. Cited in Rifkin, p. 82. 
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generations to meet their own needs.13”  Economically sustainable means network 
commerce based on the principles of “reciprocity and trust14” as well as environmentalism. 
He elaborates on the network system of commerce at some length, but at the heart of the 
network model (which Rifkin applies to a variety of systems, not just economic) is “the 
feeling that we’re all in this together.15” This solidarity should mean an end to destructive 
commercial tactics and increased awareness of the larger impact of economic actions and 
decisions. This sense of solidarity and trust will also replace competition for dwindling 
natural resources with cooperation to make the most out of the steady, renewable, 
sustainable (but still limited) supply of said natural resources.16  The cooperation of a 
network economy should help equalize distribution of wealth, which will contribute to 
sustainable social development.17  
But a network economy of the kind Rifkin suggests, one that will contribute to 
social development, may not be at all possible without a preexisting social foundation. 
Rifkin’s network commerce is based on principles of reciprocity and trust and the “feeling 
that we’re all in this together.” For solidarity and trust to replace current economic 
competition in the form of a network economy, or even as conditions necessary for the 
development of a network economy, they must exist prior to the equalized distribution of 
wealth such a network economy promises.  The origins of the critical elements of trust and 
solidarity, or embeddedness, are not clarified. Indeed, all sorts of the sustainable 
development discussed above reward, deepen, and even produce the sense of 
                                                 
13 Rifkin, Dream, p. 82. 
14 Rifkin, Dream, p. 187. 
15 Rifkin, Dream, p. 189.  
16 Rifkin, Dream, p. 185-192. 
17 Rifkin, Dream, p. 190-192. 
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embeddedness that is the European freedom ideal. But they may also require embeddedness 
in order to work, indicating that it is the primary element of sustainable development. 
Sustainable development may deepen or intensify embeddedness, trust, and solidarity, but 
it cannot be constructed without it.    
Leisure and deep play, also tenets of the European dream, would naturally do a lot 
for quality of life. Life is better when we have the time and resources to relax and play 
games. While Rifkin never exactly explains what he means by deep play in this book, he 
has clarified the term in other writings. Deep play is an activity which is an end in itself, 
such as art, religious, secular, social justice, civic, community, and sports activities.18 He 
asserts that the importance of deep play lies in the fact that social relationships, which 
originate in language and “agreed upon ways of behaving,” the basics of culture, are 
primary to all other relationships.19 Only when a society “[has] enough trust and [its 
members] have created sufficient bonds do they create trade and then government.20” By 
engaging in deep play, we create the shared experiences out of which a culture can grow 
and the “deep bonds of participation to explore our humanity, our relationships to the 
human principles of life.21” The community that plays together, stays together.  
Quality of life seems self-explanatory on the surface, but given the previous 
discussion of the divergent American and European dreams, it is worth explaining what 
exactly Rifkin means by that phrase. The American understanding of the term includes 
“access to a decent education, assuring our good health, providing adequate care for our 
                                                 
18  Kenneth Bailey, "Claiming Our Primary Role in Our Society and Global Economy," Nonprofit 
Quarterly Feb. 2001 2001 <http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/section/171.html>.  
19 Bailey, p. 2. 
20 Bailey, p. 1. 
21 Bailey, p. 1. 
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children, and living in safe neighborhoods and communities.22” In most of these areas, 
Rifkin’s statistics indicate that Europe has outdone the U.S. But, like freedom, Europe’s 
ideas about quality of life are far removed from American standards. The European 
Commission has defined quality of life as the “immaterial aspects of the living situation 
like health, social relations or the quality of the natural environment;” it should be a 
measure of both actual, concrete living conditions and the “subjective well-being of 
individual citizens.23” Quality of life is equated with happiness: “the extent to which social 
cohesion is deepened, social exclusion diminished, and social capital is grown,” which, 
along with a sustainable economy, are the hallmarks of European quality of life.24 It is not 
surprising, then, that the European Dream, like freedom, is more about “advancing the 
quality of life of a people” rather than one’s individual well-being.  
All of these primary tenets of the European Dream keep returning to 
interdependence and inclusiveness, which have shown themselves to be some of the 
absolutely fundamental aspects of the European Dream. This is not without its problems, 
however: there are a few aspects of the European Dream which are accurate assessments of 
European thought but simply cannot, by definition, aspire to the same level of 
inclusiveness as others. That is to say, some of the pillars of Rifkin’s proposal permit 
interdependence only between those who adhere  to a certain set of beliefs. The European 
concern with universal human rights and the rights of nature are a good example of this 
exclusive manner of being inclusive. Principles which extend (or aim to extend) a set of 
rights universally are inclusive in that they include all humanity (or the natural world) as 
                                                 
22 Rifkin, Dream, p. 78. 
23 Rifkin, Dream, p. 82. 
24 Rifkin, Dream, p. 82.  
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entitled to that set of basic rights. But at the same time, it is impossible to contain an 
inclusiveness of values within the concept of universal human rights or rights of nature. 
The rights which should be extended to all humans assert themselves, and by association, 
the culture which is their source, as superior by excluding conflicting beliefs and value 
systems. The implication is that subject cultures would need to adjust their values and 
traditional beliefs if universal human rights were to be made truly universal. The goal of 
this specific pillar of the European Dream is to include all humanity in the same set of 
fundamental rights. But it is a distinctly, even exclusively European understanding of 
fundamental rights which would ideally be spread.  
The fact that the European Dream espouses cultural diversity becomes problematic 
in light of the importance of universal human rights. Rifkin claims that the European 
Dream “is based on preserving one’s cultural identity and living in a multicultural world.25” 
Cultural diversity sounds very nice, and is in many ways the opposite of the traditional 
American melting pot/assimilationist view of how cultures should interact. But this non-
assimilationist, multiculturalist view seems to conflict with the interdependent, inclusive 
sense of solidarity that makes the European Dream cohesive if not necessarily feasible. 
Multiculturalism, the preservation of distinct cultural identities, can easily come in to 
conflict with universal human rights. Furthermore, cultural diversity is only possible if 
multiple and distinct cultures coexist with one another without becoming the same. 
Culture is tied up in language, social behaviors, religion, and even politics, making it 
relatively simple to be embedded within one’s own culture, thus achieving a certain degree 
of European freedom. And while one may have access to other communities in theory, that 
                                                 
25 Rifkin, Dream, p. 14.  
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access may not be real in practice, particularly if all one’s needs can be met without leaving 
one’s primary network of relationships. But how can distinct cultures (or members from 
distinct cultures) accommodate one another in community relationships, engage in deep 
play with one another, commit to universal human rights, the rights of nature or 
sustainable development together while preserving their cultural identity? This may be 
especially tricky if the source of one’s cultural identity does not have a tradition of such 
values. There is ample room for extreme cases on either side of the integration debate. It is 
not difficult for an individual or a community to seek to improve the quality of life of a 
people when that means they are helping themselves and their immediate community or 
primary network. It becomes much more complicated and difficult when several 
profoundly varied groups are preserving their cultural identities, and with them, varied 
understandings of freedom, quality of life, etc. and are asked to improve the situations of 
communities to which they do not have practical or intellectual access. It is undeniably 
possible for a cultural group to construct such a dense social and economic network that 
the group becomes insular. It is also possible for a cultural group to become acculturated 
and hybridized by over-assimilating to a dominant culture. This is the obvious and much-
lamented fallout of globalization. 
The problem is further complicated by the very concrete issue of territory: many 
native or “local” subcultures are based on traditions rooted in physical territory which may 
not always be open, while at the same time, immigrant subcultures or traditions may also 
require physical foundations. Unfortunately, Europe is crowded, literally and in the 
figurative sense of local subcultures, which makes for a good deal of territorial as well as 
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cultural defensiveness on all sides. It is one thing to make physical space, especially in light 
of the shrinking numbers of native Europeans. The population of native Europeans is on a 
sharp decline; without maintaining immigration, the aging and longer-lived older 
generations would surely overburden or completely cripple the social welfare system which 
is such an integral factor in quality of life.26 To make ideological space is another thing 
entirely, and its difficulty is likely exacerbated by territorial issues. While certain tenets of 
the European Dream would be necessarily compromised in order to make ideological room 
for cultural diversity, Rifkin notes that immigration appears to be vital for sustainable 
development within Europe.27
Although Rifkin barely addresses the apparent conflict between preservation of 
cultural identity and embeddedness or the European freedom ideal, the issue is not 
insurmountable. There are, of course, several potential solutions to the problem of 
embedding oneself within a network while preserving one’s cultural identity and place 
within a cultural network. First and foremost is the fact of globalization. Hardly anyone 
maintains just one cultural identity or social allegiance; multiple identities are now par for 
the course. Similarly, cultural identity functions on more than one level. While it serves to 
differentiate an individual from the outside world, it also provides a “social vehicle to assert 
one’s right to access to global flows.”28 Cultural identity becomes a means to freedom in 
the European sense. When identity is regarded as something embedded in multiple 
networks, it is that much freer, but also that much more difficult to define and preserve. 
The gray area between preservation of cultural identity and moving between networks gives 
                                                 
26 Rifkin, Dream, p. 253.  
27 Rifkin, Dream, p. 252. 
28 Rifkin, Dream, p. 248. 
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rise to a host of potential problems for Rifkin. If an individual is embedded in multiple 
networks, does that individual still have an authentic identity? What if the different 
networks are so different in terms of traditions and value systems that they are mutually 
exclusive? It would seem that if one maintained an authentic identity but switched between 
mutually exclusive networks, being embedded in either would be difficult at best. Although 
he does not address these concerns specifically, Rifkin finds the solution in a healthy civil 
society.  
Civil society, according to Rifkin, is a “forum for the expression of culture.”29  
Deep play originated in the civil society sector, or the third sector (the first two are business 
and government). This sector is ideally represented to modern European government by 
civil society organizations (CSOs). In the schema of the European Dream, CSOs need to be 
actively involved in the political process. Rifkin alleges that they are more trusted than the 
government or business in Europe, and are constituted of engaged, invested parties. 
Essentially, Rifkin proposes that CSOs, particularly those oriented toward universal rights 
(the civil rights movement, the environmental movement, the women’s rights movement, 
the animal rights movement, etc.) and those which represent the interest of local and 
ethnic cultural groups (native and immigrant) who are trying to preserve their cultural 
identity. Rifkin does seem aware of the dangers and pitfalls of this solution. The important 
thing, he argues, is to keep cultural groups from feeling threatened by larger forces to 
assuage the fear that one’s culture is something to defend, which participation in 
transnational policy through CSO and government cooperation ideally accomplishes. 
Provided that a given cultural group “can see Europeanization and globalization as a way 
                                                 
29 Rifkin, Dream, p. 235. 
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to…gain greater independence, maneuverability, and access to the outside world, they may 
come to view their culture more as ‘gifts to share’.”30 This would be aided by the prevalence 
of multiple or multi-network identities and allegiances. Essentially, Rifkin argues that active 
engagement in both the local and transnational community through participation in CSOs 
and an awareness (and acceptance) of the European freedom ideal, it will be possible to 
preserve the basics of one’s cultural identity.  
Hence, Rifkin does not see the potential lack of common ground between universal 
human rights and cultural identity as a necessarily crippling problem. While the European 
Dream is supposed to “connect the human race to a new shared story,” he sidesteps the 
issue of that story being a particular and in some ways very exclusive narrative. He does 
acknowledge that universal human rights can be at odds with cultural rights. He also briefly 
acknowledges that the recognition of human rights and the rights of nature “suggests a 
meta-narrative,” but only in the context of the post-modernists who preceded the European 
dream.31 The post-modernists acknowledged that “there exists at least one universal idea to 
which everyone can potentially agree – that is, that every human life has equal value and 
that nature is worthy of respect and consideration,” and it was their downfall.32 He glosses 
over the fact that this universal idea is one to which only almost everyone can agree, not to 
mention that it is an idea born of a very particular Western hegemony. What this indicates, 
then, is that some degree of cultural assimilation to at least some values held by the cultural 
majority (Leitkultur) is expected. This is not bad; it certainly does not debunk the European 
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Dream. But it does create a number of internal as well as external problems for Rifkin’s 
theory.  
Internally, the necessity of some cultural assimilation undermines the high value 
placed on cultural diversity, as well as the viability of deep play, quality of life, and 
sustainable development. Global cooperation and universal human rights can coexist as 
theories, but only if the global cooperation fits in the premises of universal human rights. 
Externally, a demand for cultural assimilation can at best lead to value judgments of 
cultures, particularly judgments by members of the Leitkultur regarding immigrant groups. 
Cultural hierarchies, especially when enforced by a governing body, can inspire exactly the 
kind of defensive attitude regarding one’s own culture and/or cultural territories that 
Rifkin warns against, not to mention deep subcultural rifts, culturally restricted and 
restrictive insular networks, as well as a general shift toward divisive, exclusive cultural 
awareness rather than the interdependent, inclusive attitude that is the European ideal.     
At this point in his proposal, Rifkin rescues the European Dream from the threat 
of structural flaws by falling back on an optimistic view of humanity and invoking 
“empathy.” The lynchpin of the European dream, he argues, is empathy: without the 
ability to recognize one’s own life struggle in the frailty, vulnerability, and struggle of 
others,33 none of these tenets are particularly viable, especially not in the way Rifkin 
intended. Empathy is what allows cultural groups to trust one another as well as work and 
play together while maintaining their distinct cultural identities. It keeps any group from 
demanding too much, and certainly aids fair distribution of resources. Empathy allows 
certain value adjustments to be viewed as a sort of fee for greater access and European 
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freedom; Rifkin believes that if cultural adjustments are approached in this way, people 
will see their cultures as “gifts to share.” The European Dream seems to require that 
cultures (Leitkulturen and subcultures) strike a fine balance between value assimilation and 
preservation of cultural identity. Empathy is also the foundation for a strong network 
economy and network government with CSO participation. Empathy makes sustainable 
development and fairer wealth distribution easier as well.    
 Rifkin’s description of the European Dream is appropriately complex – networked, 
even – enough to make it more or less structurally sound. However, this also makes it 
somewhat less plausible. As discussed above, each pillar enables but also requires the 
existence of another. Where the American Dream is fairly linear or cyclical (acquire wealth 
to become more independent to acquire more wealth) the European Dream is a more 
interdependent network of ideals. Some of the theoretical tenets of the Dream would 
conflict if they stood alone, but because they all affect one another and all tie back into 
empathy and embeddedness, the cohesive idea stands a chance. It does all sound very 
idyllic, like a semi-socialist, economically enlightened, socially advanced utopia; it has only 
ever been a dream. Just like the American dream, the European Dream sounds like it will 
disappoint its share of people. But is the European Dream actually present in the 
European consciousness? Is it this embedded, sustainable, interdependent, inclusive, 
cooperative, networked future which Europe is really working to achieve? An exploration 
of a few instances of social and cultural shock/upheaval may reveal more about the 
relationship between Europeans and the dream Rifkin claims they are pursuing.  
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III. (In)Tolerance and European Reality 
  
As reflected by the previous analysis of Rifkin’s theory, the European Dream is based on 
generalizations, is overly broad and needs some clarification. But does it reflect what 
Europeans are striving toward? Does it take into account the actual mood in Europe right 
now or shifts in the European consciousness in the past? These objections can be 
supported by isolating recent trends or even single events in Europe. But because it is 
usually not difficult to find a statistic or an instance supporting whatever one wishes to say 
about a particular community, it becomes important to explore reactions to trends or 
events as well as the events themselves. Rather than reviewing just the history of action 
surrounding a watershed event, it is often useful to explore the history of thought leading 
up to and especially resulting from it: how a society or a culture copes intellectually, 
publicly, and psychologically with a particular incident can say just as much about that 
society or culture (or network) as an analysis of the event itself.  
 
Tolerance and the Murder of Theo van Gogh 
 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, like many artists, was never so famous as after he died. 
His murder made headlines on several continents, in part because of the motive and the 
manner in which he was killed, and in part because of the fact that it happened in 
Amsterdam. Amsterdam has long been hailed as one of the most successfully multicultural 
cities in Europe; after van Gogh’s murder, the European press particularly mourned the 
Netherlands’ lost innocence and shattered ideals. Given the nation’s reputation, the van 
Gogh case – the murder, the victim, the killer – can be regarded as a litmus test of Rifkin’s 
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European Dream. It is easy to see that something must have gone wrong in order for the 
murder to have happened at all; hardly anything about the actors, not to mention the 
murder, reflects the principles Rifkin thinks Europeans are working toward.  
Theo van Gogh was a provocative Dutch filmmaker with a legendary mean streak, 
who relentlessly criticized his government, his society and his colleagues for ignoring 
intolerance. He embodied the tolerance paradox: he fought for tolerance by refusing to 
tolerate intolerant subcultures. He was a strong critic of any and all forms of religious 
fundamentalism, “Islamic oppression of women and homosexuals,” and, famously, the 
“culture of victimhood” he saw in Jewish literature and film.34 He did not simply state his 
criticism: he believed that critiques should be shouted openly, “as loudly and offensively as 
possible, until people got the point.”35 This philosophy was more than evident in his last 
film, “Submission,” made in collaboration with Somalian-born Dutch politician Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali. The film detailed various abuses of Muslim women in the name of their religion 
while words from the Koran were shown written on naked female bodies.  
 Van Gogh certainly aimed to provoke, but as was the case with other provocations, 
his was a “violent rhetoric of a place where words are normally without serious 
consequences.”36 It was in no small part because of this atmosphere that van Gogh felt the 
need to be as vulgar, shocking, and provocative as he was. Obviously, his film was taken 
not just as an insult to Islam, but as heresy. He was murdered November 2, 2004 on his 
way to work. He was shot several times, and his throat was slit; a note containing some 
jihad slogans and general threats to the West, as well as accusing Ali, his collaborator, of 
                                                 
34  Ian Buruma, "Final Cut," New Yorker 80.41 (2005): 26-32, p. 28. 
35 Buruma, p. 28. 
36 Buruma, p. 28. 
 25 
various, equally serious offenses to Islam was found  pinned to his body. More scandalous 
than the fact of van Gogh’s death, at least as far as cultural politics are concerned, was the 
fact that he was not killed by a foreign jihad crusader; his murderer had once been the 
image of successful integration. Mohammed B., as he was referred to in the press, spoke 
perfect Dutch, had completed a Dutch education, and was reputedly very much engaged in 
his community.37  He was born in Amsterdam and was a first generation Dutch citizen. He 
could even navigate the complicated red tape of the Dutch welfare system and had applied 
for welfare subsidies for his community. But for any number of reasons, he seemed to 
simply “come unhinged,” and fell in with an extremist crowd.38
 
Neither van Gogh nor his work appeared to embody the principles of multiculturalism, 
solidarity, or community building as pillars of the European Dream that Rifkin presents. 
Obviously, neither does his murder. But it is too simplistic to argue that this case 
conclusively shows Rifkin to be wrong about the goal toward which much of Europe is 
working. Instead of reviewing who did what to arrive at this point, or the history of action 
surrounding the murder, the analysis of Rifkin’s theory would benefit more from an 
exploration of the kind of thinking or progression of ideas surrounding the murder and 
any resulting shifts in popular thought.  
The reactions in the European press reflect a need to understand what went wrong, 
not only politically, but also culturally and socially. Most public voices can agree that at 
some point, integration failed. If it had been successful, Mohammed B. would have been 
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able to tolerate van Gogh and his work. Deconstructing this failure often begins by placing 
the blame on one group or another for letting young men like Mohammed B. slip through 
the cracks. Naturally, there has been a great deal of debate as to what could be done to 
solve the problem (of integration, or assimilation, or acculturation, or immigrants – this 
has not quite been agreed upon); as much or more energy has been devoted to a discussion 
of whose responsibility that change should be. In many cases the blame was placed on the 
Dutch people and the Dutch government. At the same time, in defiance of the fine line 
separating blame from responsibility, the responsibility for change was placed squarely on 
the shoulders of immigrants and subcultural groups; assimilationists claimed that a healthy 
society could only function within the boundaries of the dominant culture. 
Multiculturalists disagreed: while the dominant Dutch society certainly could be blamed 
for the current state of cultural conflict, the responsibility for change also belonged to the 
cultural majority. On the one hand, assimilationists are arguing against the breed of 
unrestrained multiculturalism in the Netherlands because it is too tolerant of intolerant 
subcultures. On the other hand, multiculturalists argue against the current form of cultural 
diversity because it is not really tolerant of subcultures. Assimilationist thinking seemed 
especially prevalent in the Dutch press; an apologetic multiculturalist line of thought seems 
more prevalent in the German press. Additionally, some European columnists held that 
the blame was the immigrants’, and the government’s for allowing them into the country; 
responsibility for change lay in the hands of the people to rise up and expel the foreigners 
from their country. Clearly, this opinion was generally espoused by the far-right, but since 
van Gogh’s murder, this group has seen a surge in new membership.      
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 The assimilationist approach to the newly tense situation, placing the blame on the Dutch 
and the responsibility for change on the cultural minorities, is a tricky position to defend 
because it finds fault with tolerance and multiculturalism, values which were previously 
immune to criticism. Paul Scheffer, a Dutch journalist and social commentator, 
exemplifies the assimilationist position in his argument that the Dutch have simply been 
too tolerant for their own (or anyone else’s) good. His assertion that tolerance can only 
exist within certain boundaries has become a sort of slogan for assimilationists across 
Europe. He explains that because neither the Dutch people nor their government set 
realistic boundaries and held immigrants to them, cultural minorities in the Netherlands 
have rarely become more than superficially assimilated. In many cases, the children of 
immigrants fall into the category of those who may speak Dutch, have Dutch jobs, and be 
Dutch citizens, but do not necessarily share the basic values of the dominant Dutch 
culture. As far as social critics like Scheffer are concerned, these superficially acculturated 
quasi-Dutch are reaping the benefits of living in a western, liberal, society like the 
Netherlands without engaging in it, without taking any responsibility for maintaining it, 
and without having any particular allegiance to it.39 Mohammed B. is a prime example of 
the worst that this kind of superficial acculturation can do. If Mohammed B. had felt a 
sense of ownership about the Netherlands, or had even a primary allegiance to the nation, 
he would have had more pride in the values of freedom of speech and religion that allowed 
van Gogh to say the things he said than pride in Islam. Scheffer is not alone in his 
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position; the assimilationist slogan has been a rallying point for many likeminded 
intellectuals. Richard Wagner puts a fine point on the issue which Rifkin completely fails 
to address: multiculturalism cannot exist at the price of human rights. If human rights were 
sacrificed to multiculturalism, governments would find themselves faced with the 
impossible task of protecting the rights granted to all its citizens without interfering in, to 
say nothing of prohibiting, actions rising from or in the service of preserving cultural 
identities, even if it means those same citizens violate the rights the government is designed 
to protect.  
Essentially, Scheffer and other assimilationists are calling for less boundless 
tolerance. The implication is clear: it is the privilege of the dominant culture in a society to 
make acceptance of its values the cost of admission or the market price of the benefits it 
offers. It is the responsibility of that culture to enable and reinforce the minimum of value 
assimilation necessary for the society to function, that is, to continue to provide those 
benefits. While assimilationists do value multiculturalism and diversity, the necessity of 
these boundaries or ground rules trumps all. In many ways, Scheffer echoes Rifkin’s 
argument for interconnectedness, inclusiveness, and solidarity. Unlike Rifkin, however, he 
recognizes that this is hard to come by in a society in which tolerance has perhaps gone too 
far, and, evidently, that it is impossible if the participants cannot agree on the boundaries 
within which they interact. It is easy to draw a connection between Rifkin’s theory and the 
goals of the Achtundsechziger: women’s liberation, accessible education, multicultural 
society, and environmental protection are considered quite important by both. These 
ideals have been realized more completely in the Netherlands than almost anywhere in 
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Europe. It is precisely the commitment to these principles, which must be recognized on 
some level as being culture-specific values, which causes assimilationists to insist on deeper 
change and acculturation on behalf of cultural minorities. Assimilationists recognize these 
liberal, Rifkinian principles as “dieselben Tugenden, die bisher die Wohlfahrt des Landes 
garantieren” of the nation but also as a threat to community.40 As one columnist put it, 
when a nation has achieved as much as the Dutch have, economically and socially, it is not 
surprising that its citizens are afraid that there’s nowhere to go but down.  
 
On the other side of the integration debate are those unwilling to give up on the utopian 
ideal that diverse cultures can not only peacefully coexist but be revitalized and 
strengthened by their awareness of each other. Rather than placing the blame for the social 
rift on the dominant society for being too tolerant and giving subcultures the responsibility 
for changing, multiculturalists place the blame on the dominant culture. Ulrich Beck, a 
German sociologist, argues that the dominant culture wrongfully demands exclusive loyalty 
and reduces individuals to a single characteristic.41 This, in addition to the fact that 
adherents of the Leitkultur cling to their stereotypes of minorities and refuse to reassess 
their own beliefs and values, particularly the (occasionally apologetic) belief that their 
culture is truly superior, has given rise to the recent waves of extremism and cultural 
retrenchment on all sides. Beck points out that there is plenty of dangerous 
fundamentalism on the part of Christians as well as Muslims, and sees multiculturalism as 
the logical opposite of and remedy for fundamentalism. The reality of a globalized world, 
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however, makes singular allegiance or identity improbable at best, especially on the part of 
cultural minorities or immigrants, who can be reasonably expected to have more complex 
or pronounced transnational identities and loyalties. Increased globalization also makes it 
more and more unlikely that members of the national dominant culture will be able to 
maintain a single-layer identity or to restrict their loyalty to their “native” culture. In light 
of such factors, multiculturalists argue that it is the Leitkultur that needs to change in order 
to accommodate both minorities and its own members. This stance on the assimilation 
issue is also appealing to many politicians and public figures: demanding that a subculture 
assimilate and asserting (however implicitly) the superiority of one’s own culture is a bit too 
close to nationalism and racism for comfort, especially in Germany.  
Rifkin would agree with Beck on some points, particularly in his analysis of the 
transnational identity. Just as Rifkin relies on empathy to inspire and hold together 
progress toward the European Dream, Beck argues that forgiveness is the key to breaking 
the cycle of parallel societies, violence, and stereotypes, which will allow multiculturalism 
to thrive.42 He goes a step beyond Rifkin in that he does acknowledge that to recognize the 
worth of a foreign culture is a difficult and complicated process; unfortunately, he does not 
give any practical suggestions as to how to do it.  Beck calls on several other concepts 
common in Rifkin’s work, such as inclusiveness, engagement, empathy and most of all 
cultural diversity. At the very least, Rifkin is shown to be in touch with the liberal-
intellectual currents of the continent. However, there is a serious distance between the 
European Dream as Rifkin describes it and the reality of the situation in the Netherlands. 
The hesitancy of intellectuals like Beck to insist on some change on the part of cultural 
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minorities or to address the problem of tolerating intolerance weakens their position 
significantly, and Rifkin’s theory faces a similar problem.  
 
Multiculturalism is an integral part of the European Dream, and the van Gogh case seems 
to show that it cannot coexist on equal footing with other building blocks of the European 
Dream (empathy, solidarity, and interdependence). Does the van Gogh case conclusively 
destroy Rifkin’s theory? Probably not. It does emphasize the theory’s central structural flaw: 
all its principles are interdependent. While it is unlikely that the European Dream could 
be realized without placing at least some value on diversity and multiculturalism, it seems 
possible that with a more linear, and less interdependent hierarchy of principles, Rifkin’s 
theory might weather such critiques with more success. To tolerate an intolerant culture 
would necessarily mean that human rights in the European sense held a lower priority than 
multiculturalism, thereby running the risk of some cultural groups enjoying more freedoms 
(of speech or religion especially) than others. To refuse to tolerate an intolerant culture 
would put human rights in their European conception in top priority, ensuring that the 
values of one culture are propagated above others. Either way, cultural inequality seems to 
be the inevitable result, and one that is not in step with Rifkin’s proposal. But if Europeans 
buckled down and acknowledged the position European/Western culture occupies, or 
admitted to believing in and perpetuating a certain degree of cultural superiority, it would 
allow them to use human rights as a foundation for the other principles of the European 
Dream. They would no longer be able to claim a commitment to true multiculturalism, but 
it seems impossible for true multiculturalism to coexist with a serious commitment to any 
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kind of universal human rights, and it would ease the contradiction of pursuing 
inclusiveness and preservation of cultural identity in equal measure.  
However, to admit cultural hierarchy would cause some tension in the paradoxical 
goal of combating intolerance by refusing to tolerate subcultures which do not conform to 
the basic goals and values of the European Dream. In purely practical terms, 
assimilationism could prove to be problematic because of the risk that immigrants might be 
unwilling to pay that price to be a part of European society. Were that the case, minority 
cultures would likely be further isolated and antagonized; this would more than likely lead 
to more violence, perpetuating rather than solving the problem. If immigration numbers 
dropped in much of Europe, the social net which is such a huge part of the Dream would 
collapse. If nothing else, this situation would show Rifkin’s theory to be flawed. Essentially, 
if an immigrant were unwilling to assimilate his or her values to those of the dominant 
culture in order to pursue the European Dream, it would refute Rifkin’s claim that the 
European Dream has the potential to lead us into the next century. On the contrary, this 
situation would reinforce the suspicion that the European Dream is not a popular dream 
in the sense of the American Dream. The European Dream may lack the allure that moves 
and inspires huge numbers of people. It may be little more than a dream for a group of left-
leaning, European intellectuals. Assimilation does not seem capable of saving the 
European Dream. But multiculturalism, even in the kindest light, does not seem like the 
solution either. 
 Dirk Schümer, a German columnist, argues that multiculturalism cannot rescue the 
situation. It has already failed, he claims, in that tolerance of diverse cultures has regressed 
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to indifference, actually making people less aware and understanding of other cultures. The 
issue of indifference is as much a problem for Rifkin’s theory as the conflict between 
multiculturalism and universal human rights, and a deeper, more complicated one at that. 
While it is neither easy nor pragmatic to rely on forced assimilation of values, it is perhaps 
more difficult to force consideration and participation. Indifference, as evidenced by the 
van Gogh case, is a real and serious trend, particularly in societies such as the Netherlands 
that seem closest to achieving something like the European Dream. But this trend is 
contrary to everything about Rifkin’s theory: indifference should have no part in the 
interdependence, the community engagement, the commitment to human rights, the 
network commerce, the sustainable development, and least of all the multiculturalism that 
Europe is supposed to be striving for. Rifkin seems to assume that Europe is populated by 
engaged, dynamic idealists with a vested interest in one another; his theory makes no 
allowances for apathy or egotism. If Scheffer and company are correct that the indifference 
has come from too much politically correct tolerance, Rifkin’s theory needs to rearrange 
priorities.  
Could the European Dream be rearranged enough that van Gogh, crusader against 
indifference, could be a part of the Dream rather than a threat to it? Perhaps. But van 
Gogh’s position in the Netherlands, the nation closest to achieving some form of the 
European Dream, was an important one. He was obnoxious, but at least it engaged people. 
According to cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek it was van Gogh’s ability to engage people that 
made him valuable. He believes political correctness and multiculturalism are the 
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neutralization of real differences and the “Ideologie des globalen Kapitalismus.”43 Žižek 
argues that multiculturalism in the form of tolerance actually is a kind of racism: the 
multiculturalist respect for the particularities of another is actually the assertion of one’s 
own superiority.44 Rifkin’s empathy, then, would seem to pander too much to the 
“politically correct fear that anyone’s specific sensibility may be hurt.”45 In doing so, it is 
not solving differences or even acknowledging them. Žižek’s theories shed a certain light 
on the principles of the European Dream which makes the dream look implausible in its 
original expression. In this light, should the European Dream be achieved, there would be 
no avoiding indifference or, at the very least, boredom. And perhaps it was the early stages 
of indifference brought on by tolerance that forced van Gogh to be so obnoxious in his 
commentary. The pillars of Rifkin’s theory are all interconnected, but there is no tension 
to keep them in balance. 
Assimilationism is risky. Tolerant multiculturalism clearly does not work. 
According to Žižek, Europe is becoming excessively politically correct and more quietly 
racist, which isn’t helping anything. There is obviously no silver bullet solution to bring 
Rifkin’s theory into step with the reality of Europe. It is worthwhile to wonder what other 
alternatives there are. Before tolerance, there was assimilation; before assimilation, there 
was acculturation. When that failed, there was generally warfare to fall back on. This would 
be out of the question in Rifkin’s utopia, because the level of interconnectedness and 
inclusiveness has to be so great for the Dream to be achieved in the first place that all 
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conflict would seem paralyzed. The social and economic networks could, in theory, reach 
such a density that they would absorb any conflict (it may seem farfetched, but imagine a 
mafia family kind of network on a European scale, but with a dispersed power center). 
Rifkin’s theory needs to make a place for conflict. As Žižek points out, repressing 
differences does not eliminate them. It feeds the conflict. As the current situation in 
Europe shows, tolerating or ignoring differences is not making them easier to deal with. 
But Germany’s past also reflects the very real danger presented by refusing to address 
differences or acknowledge conflict.  
 
Intolerance and the Hoyerswerda Riots 
 
 The argument for the importance of a forum or outlet for tension and conflict is 
furthered by the experience of German reunification. This argument, considered in light of 
the relative peacefulness of reunification, makes the wave of violence that gripped the new 
Germany somehow unsurprising. In may have been every bit as predictable as van Gogh’s 
murder. Thousands of violent crimes were committed between October 3, 1990 and 1993, 
primarily against foreigners or non-Germans, primarily by East German youth with some 
sort of radical right leanings. However, this violence was not restricted to radical youth. 
Both tacit and active support for these actions was present in entire communities, 
especially in the former East Germany. The first incident that brought this to light was the 
riots in Hoyerswerda.   
 At the time of reunification, Hoyerswerda was a mining town of about 70,000. 
Many of its residents had been moved there from all corners of the country by the East 
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German government to work the brown coal mines in the nearby hills. 46  It was a city of 
monstrous Plattenbauwohnungen and disconnected families. The government had also made 
Hoyerswerda and its mines one of several industrial areas open to Gastarbeiter, who were 
essentially ideological currency. They received three year contracts along with the chance to 
acquire technical knowledge in the jewel of the Communist Bloc, which they would take 
back to their home countries and share.47  After reunification, however, many Gastarbeiter 
did not leave. Instead, they were joined by a new wave of asylum-seekers. So when the wall 
fell, rents were raised, jobs lost, and disillusionment with the capitalist West was growing 
quickly, Hoyerswerdans who had lived and worked next to foreigners before began to find 
their presence irritating. They seemed to be everywhere, and they were a problem. They 
were blamed for a lack of apartments, higher rents, increasing crime rates, and even the 
high price of milk.48  
In October of 1991, an attack on a Vietnamese street merchant spiraled into 
almost a week of violence, fires, and rioting which culminated in the evacuation of the 
Ausländerheime in which most of the town’s 300+ asylum seekers and guest workers lived. 49  
Although attacks against non-Germans had been escalating in Germany since 
reunification, Hoyerswerda was a watershed event. It sparked a much louder discussion 
about culture, xenophobia, and East-West issues which were as yet largely unaddressed. 
Previously, violence directed toward non-Germans – regardless of their status as guest 
workers, asylum seekers, or even ethnic minorities with German citizenship – had been 
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exclusively the work of radical right wing groups, skinheads, and neo-Nazis. It was easy for 
the majority of German citizens, especially Westerners, to dismiss issues of xenophobia, 
tolerance, and violence as issues which were restricted to fringe groups.  In Hoyerswerda, 
the attacks on the dormitories housing non-Germans began with a faction of radical right-
wing youth, but a disturbingly large contingent of residents turned out to cheer them on. 
Knut Pries reported that residents brought their children to the riots after work to applaud 
the Molotov-cocktails.50 Riot police and firefighters were apparently present, but according 
to many reports, their efforts were only half-hearted and less than successful. After nearly a 
week of riots and street fighting, Hoyerswerda’s public officials ordered an evacuation of 
the dormitories. Hoyerswerda was free of foreigners.  
 This wave of violence, like most others experienced in the new German republic, 
was started by a group of young right-wing radicals. Popular opinion blamed a variety of 
factors including alcohol, peer pressure, poor parenting, violence in the media, economic 
depression, and identity crisis for the existence as well as the actions of such individuals. 
An image of radical youth was propagated which was not dissimilar to that of the young 
men responsible for school shootings in the United States: their lives lacked structure, they 
played too many video games, they were drunk and out of school or work, and they did not 
feel like part of a community.   
A 1993 compilation of statistics from the Landeskriminalamt of Sachsen produced a 
statistical profile of the province’s average violent right-wing radical. Contrary to popular 
belief, he typically did have work, or still went to school. He usually had not had previous 
run-ins with the police and was typically not at all or only a bit drunk. He was involved in 
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violent attacks carried out in unorganized groups of other like-minded young men, late at 
night as well as in broad daylight, under the slogans of various extreme right-wing parties. 
However, he generally was not a member of these groups, and knew relatively little about 
National Socialism. He placed himself in violent opposition to non-Germans of all kinds, 
guest workers, economic refugees, and asylum seekers alike, but for any of a number of 
reasons, did not or could not take part in the national discourse on the subject. Finding 
himself excluded from that discourse, he regarded violence as “ein annehmbares Mittel zur 
Lösung von Problemen.”51
 This profile is particularly interesting in relation to the Hoyerswerda riots because it 
shows how little distinguishes radical youth from the general population of former East 
Germany. The primary points of difference are the proclivity toward violence, the use of 
National Socialism, and the tendency to act in groups, and as was shown in Hoyerswerda, 
violence and group action are in no way restricted to radicals or to youth. The problems 
the violence was supposed to solve, then, were also not restricted to radicals or youth. So 
which problems was the violence supposed to solve? The most immediate and obvious 
answer is the economic and social problems unleashed by reunification. The violence 
against non-Germans was often understood in media commentary as an expression of 
despair on the part of former East Germans. It is undoubtedly true that these people felt 
some measure of despair: their experiences had trained them well enough for life in East 
Germany, but now could only provide them with “second-class citizenship in a 
reconfigured country that, if they were lucky, would provide them with dead-end jobs in 
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dying towns.52” They were fighting for a chance; they wanted their futures back. But these 
problems, in many ways, were symptomatic of deeper problems of identity, cultural 
hierarchy, and security. Whether former East Germans had supported or despised their 
nation, it had been the only one they’d ever really been a part of, and like it or not, it had 
been involved in virtually every facet of their lives. It had been the foundation of their 
cultural identities, which now needed rebuilding. It had also been an important network at 
a variety of levels, from which former East Germans had been un-embedded.  
According to interviews with teachers and religious leaders in Hoyerswerda, the 
violence against foreigners was less an issue of economics and social disparity than an issue 
of uprootedness (un-embeddedness).53 Because of the demographics in a predominantly 
industrial town such as Hoyerswerda, the community was a prime example of true “urban 
alienation.”54 Families had been relocated there by the East German government; they did 
not have connections with neighbors, with their new surroundings, or, often, with each 
other. There was very little in the way of social outlets and very little reason to form much 
of a real community. Add to this the economic and psychological shock of reunification, 
shaking or even crumbling the foundations of those few connections they did have, and 
Hoyerswerda must have exemplified the European nightmare. 
 The alienation probably contributed a great deal to the “permissive society” which 
some commentators, including Reinhard Adam and Dr. Hans-Dieter Schwind, cite as 
another primary factor of the violence in Hoyerswerda. According to them, this stems from 
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a combination of Vergangenheitsbewältigung and media influence.55 As Uwe Blazwjczyk, the 
principal of the Pablo-Neruda-Oberschule in Hoyerswerda, pointed out, authority figures 
of any kind could not stand up to the young radicals and say “Ihr dürft diese Meinung 
nicht haben,” because “das wäre wie bei der SED.”56 Even in the disillusionment of post-
reunification, people were hesitant to compromise their new rights. The prevalent attitude 
here was not necessarily indifference but deference to the right to an opinion, no matter 
what it might be. However, this deference slipped easily into a failure to challenge the 
opinion.  
 By failing to challenge (rather than prohibit) the opinions of radical youth, the 
citizens of Hoyerswerda missed an opportunity to make room for conflict. And as Zizek 
would have predicted, the failure to acknowledge or make room for conflict contributed to 
the violence. In addition, the increasing influence of the media and the decreasing shock 
value of everyday violence and vulgarity left few alternatives but the last absolute taboo left 
in Germany: fascism. That a taboo was broken is generally agreed upon. Why it was broken 
is a source of much speculation: it might have been because East Germans did not have an 
opportunity to work through their fascist past, or because the citizens of the five new 
provinces were not yet “ripe for democracy,”57 or simply because the young radicals knew it 
would “ihre Eltern verstummen und ihre Lehrer blass werden […] lassen.”58 It may have 
been a cry for release from the value of tolerance itself: especially in the wake of the 
peaceful revolution, a case could be made that the conflict which usually accompanies such 
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drastic change found a different forum for expression/outlet in intolerance (of foreigners, 
certainly, but also of one another). While National Socialism may always itself be taboo in 
Germany, the excess of publicity received by the neo-Nazis who perpetrated so much of the 
violence against foreigners, as well as the political change that violence affected, changed 
the public reception of intolerance. As Elisabeth Bauschmid pointed out, it became more 
acceptable, or at least less shocking, to identify oneself as opposed to immigration, or even 
as xenophobic.59       
 The uprootedness, the permissive society, and the failure to address conflict point 
to two critical elements which may help explain what happened in Hoyerswerda. First of 
all, the town had apparently never developed much in the way of local networks. Without a 
local network within which to embed themselves, Hoyerswerdans might have been 
especially embedded in other networks at other levels, such as the national network or a 
job or industry related network. These networks were effectively destroyed with 
reunification. The lack of networks or a cohesive community probably contributed to the 
failure of the community to challenge xenophobic opinions and behavior in the town’s 
youth. Citizens (even elected officials) evidently did not feel secure enough in their 
positions to assert any kind of authoritative judgments. This insecurity can be examined at 
a community level, where citizens may not have felt like a part of the network, thus having 
no right or no reason to assert opposing opinions. It can also be examined at an individual 
level: perhaps citizens did not feel secure enough in their identities to have the conviction 
of opinion to voice any opposition.  
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 This failure to challenge xenophobia, of course, was also due to the fact that anti-
immigrant sentiment was not restricted to radical youth. After losing national and many 
job-related networks, the citizens of Hoyerswerda, like most former East Germans, made 
the cultural network of West Germany their target network. They wanted access to it, to 
the rights and privileges it made available, and to the life it made possible. The fact that the 
new (i.e. West) German cultural network was suddenly in such high demand was a critical 
element of the violence in Hoyerswerda. Hoyerswerdans understood that target network as 
having limited space, and saw immigrants as competition and a threat to their chances. In 
this case, the heightened attention toward non-Germans of all kinds may have helped East 
Germans, especially those involved in the violence, to ensure that they were included in 
the reconfigured definition of “German.” By helping create a negative or exclusionary 
definition of the term, they made a loud and angry point that they were included in it. 
Along with demands that all foreigners be deported and assertions of white superiority, 
these rioters also yelled slogans like “Ihr koennt mir alles nehmen, nur nicht das Recht, 
Deutscher zu sein.”60 As Adam points out, it sounds more like a cry for help than a cry of 
triumph. It is the sound of someone who knows he’s being left behind.61 This sense of 
being abandoned by society made radicals feel that their inclusion in the term “German” 
was threatened.  
 But why weren’t former East Germans automatically included in the dominant 
cultural network? Ideally, Easterner or Westerner would not have mattered after 
reunification. That it did became clear even a few months after the initial euphoria wore 
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off. It was relatively simple to reunite the two nations politically compared to the cultural 
reunification that had not yet taken place. To erase the border on a map did not aid any 
sort of reunification of cultures. According to Reinhard Mohr, many former citizens of 
East Germany not only felt exploited and marginalized, but colonized by the West.62 At the 
same time, West Germans felt put upon by the economic needs of the five new provinces. 
With higher taxes in the west and higher unemployment rates in the east, economics was 
certainly an issue. Bauschmid has also argued that social problems must have played a role 
in the violence.63 The disequilibrium on both sides of the old border was palpable; neither 
Easterners not Westerners felt at home in their new unified nation. They suddenly felt like 
foreigners in their own towns, which in many ways prevented them from participating or 
taking an interest in the dialogue between the East and West. Both Easterners and 
Westerners shared a perception of loss related to the foundations of their cultural 
identities which inspired a certain idealization of the past and a defensiveness toward their 
present cultural networks.  
 Peter Glotz observed that this was not just a question of geography: “die Sprach- 
und die Verhaltenscodes der bürgerlichen Schicht, die eigentlich zusammenhalten müsste, 
geraten durcheinander.”64 This confusion in the codes or norms of the new Germany’s two 
halves is especially problematic in light of the governing bodies and economy. All in all, it 
was easy to claim that there was an unequal distribution of power, political, economic, and 
cultural, and all scales tipped toward the West. Mohr argued that when East Germans were 
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faced with the “Banalität der Freiheit,” combined with the disappointment of the 
continued disparity in almost all facets of life between East and West, the rift between the 
two cultures was deepened rather than mended.65 According to Mark Siemons, it also 
helped to perpetuate the victimization of East Germans.66 What all this boils down to is 
the failure of dialogue between the two formerly independent nations:  
“der Osten artikuliert sich vornehmlich in unberechenbaren 
Trotzreaktionen; im Westen, der die 
Kommunikationshoheit besitzt, unter deren Schirm sich 
freilich eine von ihr abgekoppelte östliche 
Eigenkommunikation etabliert hat, breitet sich Unbehagen 
aus.”67  
 
There seemed to be no truly national discourse in which to participate, and certainly not 
one which would have been equally accessible to all Germans. By so rarely relating violent 
behavior to the individual, the media discussion probably only reinforced the perception of 
distance between these individuals and an appropriate forum in which to address the 
conflict, which may in turn have contributed to the sense of defensiveness on the part of 
the rioters.  
 
The failure to address conflict in Hoyerswerda, as well as the defensive attitudes of nearly 
everyone involved in the situation reflect some of the same issues which were raised in the 
wake of the van Gogh murder. First and foremost, a parallel can be drawn between the 
failure to address latent conflict and intolerance. However, the rhetoric surrounding the 
intolerance in Hoyerswerda takes on more complex mutations because intolerance could 
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not be as easily dismissed as “foreign,” making the relationship between that intolerant 
subculture and the dominant cultural network rather muddied. In the case of van Gogh, 
the dominant cultural network was able to put more distance between itself and the 
intolerance of minorities. The belief that such violent conflict was practically inevitable 
given the low assimilation of immigrant populations was prevalent in the wake of the van 
Gogh case. In the case of the Hoyerswerda riots, popular opinion seemed to reflect that the 
violence was the natural conclusion to the abuse of Germany’s liberal asylum laws. This 
stance was common among conservative politicians, including Wolfgang Schmitz, the 
district administrator (Landsrat), whose comments to the press in the days during and after 
the riots were nothing short of a public relations catastrophe.68  
 There were, naturally, voices opposing this attitude. Schwind, for example, 
proposed five basic solutions to the issues raised by the violence in Hoyerswerda, including 
the suggestion that steps be taken to ease integration into German society. He suggested 
that this could be achieved by simplifying the process of naturalization for German-born 
foreigners, raising standards for housing and education for young foreigners, the 
acceptance and inclusion of non-native Germans in civil service, and a consistent and 
comprehensive asylum law for all European Community member states. The discussion 
surrounding multiculturalism, though not as loud as the discussion following van Gogh’s 
murder, was also present in the aftermath of the Hoyerswerda riots and seemed to lean the 
same direction. In some cases, multiculturalism was decried as unnatural and having 
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proven itself to be “multikriminell” as well.69 Moderates, like Schwind, pinned 
multiculturalism down as “utopian” and insisted that it could not function and never had 
in the face of high unemployment and lack of living space such as Germany was 
experiencing at the time.70 Even Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, said what was often 
alluded to in the aftermath of the van Gogh murder: “whoever will not play by the rules of 
democratic, peaceful coexistence will be deported.”71 If subcultures won’t conform to the 
values or customs of the dominant culture, they will be excluded from the network. The 
van Gogh case and the violence in Hoyerswerda in particular (and all of reunified Germany 
in general) had similar impacts on public opinion and even policy. Despite the counter-
protests, and in some cases, counter-violence, German politics listened to the rioters. The 
asylum seekers and guest workers were evacuated from Hoyerswerda. And, like the Dutch 
after the van Gogh murder, Germans themselves supported stricter asylum laws, and 3 out 
of 5 were apparently “sympathetic to the motives behind the attacks.72”  
 The new Germany portrayed in the media fallout from the Hoyerswerda riots 
seems to reflect very little of the European Dream Rifkin describes. As Schwind so astutely 
notes, empathy seemed to be rarer and rarer, while indifference grew.73 Alienation of 
individuals and cultural groups was typical. The only evidence of networked economy or 
government seemed to be in the groups of Westerners who saw economic or political 
opportunity in the new provinces. Hoyerswerda itself, though certainly far from the 
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European Dream ideal to begin with, was a display of the powerful vacuum even an ideal 
can leave behind. 
 It can be argued that the GDR had prepared its citizens for a life in some measure 
closer to the European Dream, with interconnectedness, solidarity, and networked 
government and economies. But the interconnectedness and the networks took on the 
form of corruption and distrust, and the multiculturalism was little more than a front for 
ideological currency. Hoyerswerdans, at least, were certainly unhappy before reunification. 
East German author Brigitte Reimann described the city in the 1960s as monotonous and 
ugly, with incidences of violence and an ominous feeling in the air.74 Even the East 
German city planners had understood that they needed to keep its residents still, which 
was more or less achieved through higher salaries, more apartments, and a wider variety of 
goods for purchase in Hoyerswerda than in most comparable populations.75 So what were 
former East Germans looking for in the West? As mentioned earlier, they may have been 
looking for a way to embed themselves in the West German network. They may have been 
looking for a new foundation for their cultural identities. And perhaps some, having been 
disappointed by the inaccessibility of their target network or by the “Banalität der 
Freiheit,”76 were looking for a way to idealize their lost homeland. 
 Being abandoned or rejected by a network creates a conflict, which in the case of 
Hoyerswerda was not effectively addressed. The loss of or threat to the identity attached to 
that particular network sparks the defensive attitude toward identity as based on being a 
part of a network. It is not unlikely that it arose from the drastic social and economic 
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changes taking place in the wake of reunification. The dissolution of social and economic 
structures familiar to the citizens of Hoyerswerda effectively dislodged or un-embedded 
them from various networks, most obviously the overarching national network that was the 
GDR. This sense of loss would have been especially acute in light of the lack of local 
networks and the sense of isolation ascribed to Hoyerswerda. And as peaceful as the 
dissolution of that network may have seemed (or perhaps because of that peacefulness), it 
was the source of repressed conflict. But the threat to identity could not have been simply 
the loss of social services.  
 This threat probably grew out of the loss of one network and the (at least perceived) 
competition for another. Hoyerswerdans were, in some ways, trying to force their 
embeddedness in the new German network. They seem to have perceived their inclusion 
in that network, which is to say their identity as Germans, threatened by immigrants 
because they understood the network to have limited space and resources available. As 
evidenced by the violence in Hoyerswerda, the issue of exclusive and finite networks is a 
very real problem. This understanding of networks is not one which Rifkin addresses, but 
it does have some serious implications for his theory. Rifkin’s explanation of the European 
Dream relies heavily on his definition of freedom as embeddedness in a network. If a 
network has limited space and finite resources, or is even perceived as such, it cannot grant 
access to all those who might want it. The very idea that a network grants or refuses/fails to 
grant access to someone seems contradictory to the principles of inclusiveness touted by 
Rifkin. It also seems that such a conception of networks would inspire rather than quell 
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competition, accomplishing the opposite of the solidarity and trust which are the 
foundation of those networks.   
 Could competition for networks be avoided? It is not unthinkable. In a school 
lunchroom some tables, like networks, are perpetually contested and others have room to 
spare. The difference can be accounted for by the social hierarchy. The way to ease 
competition to sit at the popular table is for it to become less popular. Similarly, cultural 
networks with limited space could avoid competition if a single network were less in 
demand. Hoyerswerdans, like many former East Germans, were sensitive to the fact that 
while they had long been interested in what it was like in the West, most Westerners had 
been more comfortable patiently ignoring their neighbors. This reflects the internal 
structure of the new German network, where the West occupied a dominant position, able 
to restrict access and set the boundaries within which subcultures ought to function. 
Restricted networks seem to crack Rifkin’s theory through its emphasis on solidarity: if not 
everyone can be embedded in a particular network, can we still “all [be] in this together?”77  
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IV. Neither Here nor There 
Multicultural Identity and the European Dream 
 
One of the primary characteristics of the sort of dream discussed above is that it can be 
universalized. That is, it is a dream which is attractive to those who are not members of the 
culture or nation from which the dream emerged. This is particularly valid for the 
European Dream insofar as Rifkin spends a great deal of time comparing it with the 
American Dream, which in many ways was the driving force behind much of the economic 
change in the world over the last century. So how accessible, literally and figuratively, is the 
European Dream to non-Europeans? Is Rifkin’s vision of future society something toward 
which immigrants are trying to move? Is it in pursuit of that dream that they come to or 
stay in Europe?   
 As shown in earlier chapters, there is plenty about the relationship between 
Europeans and the European Dream which can be understood through primary sources 
and media reactions to events which seem to threaten the dream. The relationship between 
immigrants and the European Dream, on the other hand, is more tenuous and shifting, and 
less easily observed. There is a much greater margin of error when immigrant voices are 
represented in majority media. In addition, threats to the European Dream can take the 
shape of foreigners (as in the van Gogh murder), resulting in a reflexive exclusion of 
foreigners from the discourse. The more threatened the European Dream, it seems, the less 
accurate a measure of its accessibility and appeal to non-Europeans can become. For this 
reason, the window into the relationship between immigrants and the European Dream 
which is provided by non-Europeans through films, novels, or other cultural artifacts is 
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especially valuable. Through their depiction of the dream (explicit or implicit), as well as 
their portrayal of Europe and non-Europeans, it is possible to gain some insight into their 
pursuit or rejection of the dream. In this chapter, I will explore the depiction of the 
European Dream in the films of Fatih Akin, a novel by Zafer Senocak, and Vladimir 
Kaminer’s satire. A study of these artists and their works will clarify some non-European 
approaches to the dream.  Some of the unforeseen obstacles to achieving it, as well as the 
responses to those obstacles, may also provide some illumination to the question of the 
accessibility of the European Dream from outside European thought. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the accessibility of these “minority” texts to Europeans can reveal more about 
the evolution or perhaps even realization of the European Dream.  
 
 
Conflicted Identity in Fatih Akin’s Films 
 
Among the most well-known “non-European” filmmakers at work in Germany today is 
Fatih Akin. His films, which include Kurz und Schmerzlos (1998), Im Juli (2000), Solino 
(2002), and most famously, Gegen die Wand (2003), tend to prominently feature immigrants 
and the conflict between traditional and modern life. His films and the characters in them 
also typically gravitate toward Istanbul, which Akin often portrays as a sort of romanticized, 
milk-and-honey, end-of-the-journey kind of place. Solino is his only major film which does 
not deal explicitly with Turkey at all, dealing instead with Italian immigrants, but its story 
is easily extended to Turkish immigrants as well. In other films, such as Kurz und Schmerzlos, 
Turkey itself is never shown, which actually reinforces its position as a sacred place or 
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refuge. Germany, usually Hamburg, presents a convenient foil to Turkey: Germany is 
imperfect, familiar, and when one of Akin’s figures leaves Germany for Turkey, it is almost 
always due to some sort of crisis situation and accompanied by a dramatic, revelatory shift 
in character. The change of location often accompanies a change of identity. Taken 
together, these changes reflect changes between networks, which will prove to be one of the 
most primary obstacles to the European Dream for Germany’s minority and immigrant 
populations.  
 In Kurz und Schmerzlos, Akin depicts three close friends from Hamburg struggling to 
maintain their friendship as their goals diverge. Gabriel, a Turkish-German, has just been 
released from prison and has resolved to get his life together and stick to the straight and 
narrow. His friend Bobby, a Serb, is moving in the opposite direction, trying to start a 
career with the Albanian mafia. Costa, a Greek, is at loose ends after his relationship with 
Gabriel’s sister fails; after swearing off petty theft, he gets caught up in Bobby’s plans. Kurz 
und Schmerzlos is something of a standard with regard to Akin’s approach to multicultural 
life in Germany: conflict between tradition and modernity is a part of every day. It is rarely 
resolved, and almost never without violence. It seems that the hyphenated Germans in the 
film didn’t stand much of a chance at happiness or success in Germany. Gabriel, the film’s 
protagonist and the only one of the three friends to survive, follows the “return to the lost 
homeland” pattern when he escapes to an Istanbul the audience never even sees. He is 
arguably reestablishing rather than searching for his identity, but it is clear that he cannot 
do either with much success in Hamburg.  
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In Solino, Akin tells the story of an Italian Gastarbeiter family in Duisburg. The 
father works in a mine but quits after a short time because he finds the work degrading. He 
and his wife decide instead to open an Italian restaurant and pizzeria. Meanwhile, their two 
young sons develop a friendship with a German girl from the neighborhood. The longer 
the family stays in Germany, the more fragile their relationships with one another become. 
Eventually, it is torn apart by jealousy, crime, ambition, and the mother’s illness. The 
mother leaves her husband and Germany to return to her hometown of Solino, Italy, 
which she never really wanted to leave in the first place. Her younger son follows when her 
illness becomes serious, leaving a budding career in documentary filmmaking and his lover 
(the German girl he and his brother befriended as children) at the mercy of his brother, 
who promises to come after a few weeks to take his turn at caring for their mother. 
However, mother and son are more or less abandoned by the other members of their 
family. The elder brother seems to take over his younger brother’s life, even accepting 
prizes in his name, and does not make it back to Italy until years later. In the end, the elder 
brother is alone and unhappily successful in Germany, while the dutiful younger brother is 
happily married and invested (embedded) in his hometown. This story reflects one of the 
most prevalent themes in Akin’s work: foreigners in his films are unlikely to find happiness 
in another country; they stand a better chance where they came from.  
 Akin’s most successful and complex film to date is undoubtedly Gegen die Wand. 
Gegen die Wand is the first in a trilogy of films called Liebe, Tod und Teufel. The film is, Akin 
insists, nothing but a love story. He had hoped to explore how love is constructive and 
destructive, how the good and evil in the world and in individuals reacts and interacts with 
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it. The film is certainly a love story, but that love story also acts as a vehicle for exploration 
(however inadvertent) of other issues of identity, integration, and freedom. Cahit, a forty-
something bum, meets Sibel, a fiery twenty-year-old, in the psychiatric ward of a hospital 
after he tries to kill himself by driving his car into a cement wall. Sibel has recently slit her 
wrists in an attempt to escape her conservative, traditional family. She proposes a marriage 
of convenience, which Cahit eventually accepts. She moves in with him after the wedding, 
and although they appear to have nothing in common but their Turkish heritage, they 
grow closer. In the meantime, however, they both have affairs; this (inevitably) ends badly 
when they realize that they are in love. Cahit goes to prison for the accidental killing of one 
of Sibel’s lovers, and Sibel, disowned by her immediate family, moves to Turkey to live 
with her divorcee cousin. She promises to wait for Cahit. But after a downward spiral of 
drugs, rape, and violence, she is mysteriously rescued by a taxi driver. By the time Cahit is 
released and comes to Turkey to find her, she seems to have moved on with her life (she 
has a husband and daughter). Eventually she arranges to meet Cahit at his hotel. They 
finally sleep together and she agrees to go away with him to his native village. The end of 
the movie is appropriately open-ended: Cahit sits in a bus, Sibel’s whereabouts are 
unknown. Although it is a far stretch from a happy ending, it seems cautiously optimistic, 
especially in comparison to the screenplay’s original ending, which brought Cahit and 
Sibel back to the point they were at in the beginning of the story.78 As in so many of Akin’s 
films, these characters are looking for themselves; the ending successfully conveys Akin’s 
intention that the search is far from over for either Cahit or Sibel.  
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 As an effect of Akin’s interest in “seekers” and his life experiences in the 
“multikulti” Altona neighborhood of Hamburg, most of Akin’s films are occupied by 
navigating the space between culture and tradition79 as a part of the search for identity. 
Gegen die Wand is certainly his most complex response to the issue, in that it does not 
reduce its multicultural characters or their elusive identities to an either-or decision. It does 
not condemn Turkish traditionalism or conservative families, nor does it depict German 
culture as inherently corrupt and destructive. However, it also does not allow either culture 
to act as a cure-all for the central characters’ conflicted quests for identity. Akin avoids any 
binary discussion of culture both in his films and his interviews, and dislikes being referred 
to as someone who makes films for foreigners or Gastarbeiter. He is, he insists, nothing 
more than a German filmmaker with Turkish roots, and certainly not some sort of 
spokesperson for Germany’s immigrant population.80 He understands the marginalizing 
effect such a classification can have on the reception of his work.  
 Despite his efforts to eliminate ideas about cultural binaries from the discussion 
about immigration and assimilation, Akin is nevertheless considered a minority, a Turkish-
German, and the subject matter of his major films reinforces the distinction. The 
popularity of Gegen die Wand, and the position it occupies in cultural discourse, are aided 
by the enthusiastic responses of other Turkish-Germans who identify with the conflicts 
presented in the story. Akin’s own background is relatively common: he was born in 
Hamburg in 1973 to Turkish parents who emigrated as Gastarbeiter in the 1960s. Although 
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he traveled often to Turkey and considers Istanbul his “holy city,”81 Hamburg was and is 
his home.82 Gegen die Wand was inspired by real situations which arose in Turkish-German 
families. That it has been hailed by many Turkish Germans as a realistic representation of 
usual personal and cultural conflicts is unsurprising, as is its treatment by many non-Turks 
as a sort of primary source material for cultural critique. Would the same kind of credence 
be given to his work if they were made by an ethnic German? It seems unlikely.83 His 
heritage lends an authenticity to his commentary on and representation of the situation of 
minorities in Germany.  
  
The media depictions of the Turkish-Germans involved in Gegen die Wand reveal that a 
large gulf remains between what is accepted onscreen and what is accepted in reality. The 
film was praised as an accurate portrayal of Turkish-Germans, but a distorted expectation 
of the Turkish-Germans who did the portraying seems if not common, then prevalent in 
the media. It is interesting that it was the Bildzeitung which crusaded against Sibel Kekilli, 
the lead actress, when her earlier work in pornographic films became known. Although 
Turkish-Germans also condemned her past, it was a German media outlet which took on 
the task of essentially punishing her for failing to fulfill a conservative, stereotypical image. 
By doing so, it may have done more to reinforce what it understands (and criticizes) to be 
Turkish traditionalism than the traditionalists themselves. The Bildzeitung seemed to suffer 
from a feeling of entitlement toward the  expectations of that Turkish traditionalism. What 
inspires this appropriation of cultural or moral authority? It may be a distorted 
                                                 
81 Gegen die Wand, Audiokommentar 
82 Gegen die Wand, Audiokommentar 
83 It is equally unlikely that Akin’s work would have been given a similar treatment in this paper.  
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multiculturalism which entails an awareness or understanding of various cultures, but also 
requires clearly drawn boundaries which define as well as restrict movement between 
different cultures. Although his films reflect an awareness of this kind of cultural 
restriction, Akin argues for the opposite. He quotes Ataturk: “every language is a person, a 
culture…for every person there is a different lifestyle.”84 The central figures in his films 
reflect this attitude, particularly in their failure to completely embed themselves in any 
networks.  
The issue of cultural boundaries is among the issues relevant to the European 
Dream which Rifkin failed to consider. Akin’s films accurately illustrate some common 
problems immigrants face in pursuit of the European Dream, including the problem of 
multicultural identity and embeddedness in various networks framed by cultural and 
historical conflict. As discussed above, the characters in Gegen die Wand are searching for 
themselves. Although the search begins in Germany, it brings them to Turkey, where the 
audience sees them last. Evidently, nothing in Germany can direct them; their identities 
are arguably located outside of Western Europe’s borders. However, the film ends as the 
figures continue their respective searches, so their identities are not necessarily located in 
Turkey either. The fact that the central figures in the film leave Germany and Western 
Europe in search of themselves is not in itself terribly significant to the European Dream. 
What is significant is the relationship between what they had or had access to in Germany 
compared with what they are trying to find in Turkey.  
Among the most discussed obstacles standing between immigrants and integration, 
as well as the European Dream, is the myth of the lost homeland. It is common for 
                                                 
84 Gegen die Wand, Audiokommentar. 
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immigrants to idealize their origins, particularly when their host country does not live up to 
its image. This idealization typically entails a sense of exile: the homeland, as perfect as it 
was, is gone forever. That the homeland is lost is important because it provides an 
explanation or excuse for the immigrants’ continued presence in their host country. 
Although this attitude is becoming rarer in minority texts, it is difficult to judge whether it 
is equally rare among minorities. If nothing else, it is regularly attributed to minority 
populations, especially in the wake of cultural conflict.85 But this attitude toward the 
homeland does not carry into Akin’s work. While Sibel and Cahit are of Turkish descent, 
and even speak some Turkish, they do not regard Turkey as a lost homeland; it is not a 
place they or their families seem to romanticize or idealize, nor is it a place to which they 
cannot return. Although Turkey is certainly more romanticized in Akin’s earlier films, the 
country is never placed on the pedestal of being forever lost. Instead, Akin portrays “the 
homeland” as a last ditch escape route. It is never free of risks, it is certainly not as familiar 
as Germany, but it does provide the way out for several main characters whose attempts to 
achieve the European Dream in Germany appear to have failed. When Sibel’s attempts at 
switching between networks fails and she is rejected by both her family network and the 
Altona network, she conveniently avoids forcing the issue by abandoning hope at 
belonging to either and flees to Turkey where she is arguably not a member of any network 
at all. It is worth noting that Akin does not depict any immigrants returning to their 
homelands in triumph.  
                                                 
85 The media discussion of this attitude is almost as proprietary as the Bildzeitung’s crusade against Kekilli. 
It seems that regardless of whether immigrants actually romanticize their lost homelands, the insistence on 
the part of the dominant culture that they do appears to be a distancing strategy. It is easier to avoid taking 
responsibility for failed integration if immigrants refuse to give up an idealized version of their homeland.  
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Another issue Akin questions is the unified, insulated family and community 
structure as well as the homogenous value system which it propagates. The exclusive nature 
of immigrant communities in Europe is somewhat legendary. So called Parallelgesellschaften 
are often blamed for failed integration, as was the case in the wake of the van Gogh murder 
discussed above. This is not just a threat to integration, however. It is an obstacle to the 
European Dream. Although it is true on some level of any network, insulated and exclusive 
networks enable better enforcement of social codes and a common value system. Without 
interaction between networks, this hinders the empathy, interconnectedness, and access to 
different networks which are fundamental parts of the European Dream. The scenario of 
insulated, exclusive communities is regularly associated with conservative Turkish or 
Muslim communities in Europe. Akin rejects this image of Turkish communities in Gegen 
die Wand. Instead, he depicts a traditional community which is clearly separate but not 
completely isolated from modernity. He also illustrates variations of value systems and 
social codes, or at the very least various degrees of adherence to or faith in them. Especially 
in his portrayal of Sibel’s family, he shows differences in opinion between family members. 
In the interactions between her family and Cahit or his “uncle,” it is clear that although 
they can discuss which village in Turkey they come from, they do not share the same values 
or beliefs about their native culture. The attitudes toward religion also vary widely from 
character to character. It is also important to note that Sibel’s mother disagrees with her 
husband on several occasions, mostly about Sibel. Akin’s film reflects an intricacy in 
(traditional) networks which is not apparent in Rifkin’s theory. In light of this, it is 
important to examine just what constitutes a network.  
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 Cahit and Sibel do not go to Turkey in pursuit of their lost homeland. It is possible but 
unlikely that they are fleeing the conflict between tradition and modernity. They had or at 
least had access to a spectrum of relationships in Germany. The structure of Rifkin’s 
European Dream appeared to be present in Germany: Sibel had a family and Cahit had his 
friend and “uncle.” More than that, what social and economic structure is depicted in the 
film could arguably be related to the interconnected network structure of the European 
Dream. Cahit does not have real family, but the network connections are there in the form 
of his job with his friend and his relationship with the hairdresser, which are encompassed 
by the community centered around the bar they visit regularly (Cheers ala Altona?). When 
Sibel lands in this network, it helps her find a job, lovers, and some support after Cahit is 
sent to prison. It is not much of a community, but it is there. Furthermore, it is contained 
within the German social system, which plays its own well-intentioned but kind of dopey 
role in the form of the health care system in general and the doctor in particular who try to 
put Sibel and Cahit back together after their attempted suicides. The effectiveness of the 
system is questionable, but it is certainly representative of some kind of empathy and 
embeddedness.  
The developments which take place in Turkey, on the other hand, can hardly be 
related to Rifkin’s European Dream. It is not just physically cold, it is portrayed as an 
indifferent city.  A simple contrast between the bar in Altona with the bar in Istanbul 
reflects the absolute dearth of community or network Sibel finds in Turkey: while the one 
is warmly lit and appears accessible, the other is dark, with cold green and red light. When 
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Sibel’s lover is killed in the Altona bar, everyone present notices that something is wrong 
and it seems a matter of course that help is called immediately, but when Sibel passes out 
on the floor in the Istanbul bar, no one there gives more notice to the body on the floor 
than it takes to step over it. Later in the film she is stabbed and beaten nearly to death in 
the street. The beating itself can be interpreted in a variety of ways, but it is only chance 
that she survives. If the Turkish health system has anything to do with her recovery, it is 
neither shown nor referred to. If the European Dream is even weakly reflected in Akin’s 
portrayal of Hamburg, it is completely absent from Istanbul.  
 All of this seems to imply a disconnect or a contrary relationship between the 
identities of the two central figures and the European Dream. Would it have been possible 
for Cahit to turn his life around after leaving prison if he had returned to his network? He 
seems to consider something along those lines in a scene just before he goes to Istanbul, 
where he stands for a moment outside his ex-lover’s salon, watching her, but turns away 
without going in. It is unlikely that he could have returned to his old life and old 
community without also returning to the drugs and alcohol that lubricated his interactions 
with them. Sibel’s situation is a bit more complicated. The morning after Cahit is 
presumably arrested and she slits one of her wrists, she sees her brother waiting for her 
outside her apartment. She turns and runs. It is clear that he has come in order to exact 
retribution for the family’s “sullied” honor. It seems that she has not only lost access to her 
primary network (her family) but also the second one she shared with Cahit (their 
neighborhood). After she arrives in Turkey, the only figure with whom she appears to 
identify is a Turkish weightlifter on television.  
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  By the end of the film it is clear that whatever Sibel and Cahit are looking for, they 
will not find it in one another. This makes sense, in light of the fact that they seem to 
gravitate away from established connections (embeddedness). Assuming a relative 
definition of identity,86 the more firmly embedded one becomes in a single, restrictive 
network, the less likely one is to establish an identity that extends beyond that group. This 
sort of identity definition also precludes embeddedness in a variety of networks, or access 
to a variety of relationships, which Rifkin sees as freedom under the European Dream. The 
central characters’ struggle to establish or discover identities independent of their primary 
networks, then, can be read as a quest for the freedom of the European Dream.  If an 
identity can be more clearly defined through exposure to a variety of networks or 
communities, or through freedom, can that identity also be embedded in those networks? 
Rifkin fails to address the issue of fundamentally conflicting networks. Sibel’s immediate 
family can be considered as a network, but it seems impossible for her to be a part of that 
network as well as the Altona network. The only way in which to access both of them is by 
repressing part of her identity in each. The failure of this strategy results in rejection from 
both networks. 
Given that empathy and identification feed off of one another, is it humanly 
possible to actually be embedded in several networks? Is it possible to empathize and 
identify with two thoroughly conflicting networks, and still be actually embedded in them? 
It would seem that if one identifies indiscriminately, that identification is either 
meaningless or there is no central identity to do the identifying. There is perhaps some sort 
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of limit beyond which empathy or identification with another actually dissolves distinct 
identities. This may explain Sibel’s desire to buy into the European Dream by embedding 
herself in a variety of networks. She needed more variety or difference in order to figure 
out her own identity, so she moved beyond her restrictive primary network. But to embed 
herself in another, completely different network, and to access the relationships she 
wanted, she was forced to compromise her position in her primary network.87  To identify 
simultaneously with her conservative Turkish network and her modern Altona network 
proved as impossible as identifying with only one of them. Working from the premise that 
identity requires difference rather than empathy, it seems that Cahit and Sibel must go 
their separate ways to define their identities. Although Akin emphasized their differences 
at the beginning of their relationship, each takes on aspects of the other over the course of 
the film. Even after years apart, they empathize too much with one another to help clarify 
the boundaries of their individual identities. Among the obstacles to the European Dream 
presented in the film, the simple fact that the search for individual identity takes 
precedence over and even seems to preclude embedding oneself in a community or 
accessing a variety of relationships through diverse networks is one of the most basic 
problems Rifkin’s theory faces.   
Considered on the larger scale of cultural identity, dissolution can be seen as the 
first stage of acculturation. Ideally, a give-and-take relationship between different cultures 
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eventually makes them one. They dissolve into one another. But when the situation 
involves a cultural hierarchy, it is less likely that the dominant culture will take on aspects 
of the minority culture. This problem of dissolving identity, or the conflict between 
preserving cultural identity and promoting empathy and interconnectedness, is one of the 
fundamental problems facing Rifkin’s theory. If identity is to be preserved on an individual 
or a cultural level, difference, rather than empathy, seems necessary. This presents Rifkin’s 
theory with something of a paradox: to achieve the European Dream, one must empathize 
without compromising identity, and maintain the boundaries of identity without creating 
an exclusive or insular network.  
 
Constructed Identity in Gefährliche Verwandschaft  
 
This problem of conflicting networks and cultural identities is at issue in Zafer Senocak’s 
novel, Gefährliche Verwandtschaft.  His talent with essays is reflected in the structure of his 
novel, where each chapter reads a little like a narrative essay. Senocak uses this structure to 
convey the episodic nature of his narrator’s search for identity, which focuses primarily on 
his past and wrestles with the fact that Sascha Muteschem is the product of wholly 
conflicting networks and the convergence of opposite sides of history. Much like the 
figures in Akin’s films, Sascha’s struggle to locate or define his identity, as well as his 
difficulty with accessing or embedding himself in various networks, reveal some potential 
obstacles to achieving the European Dream. Senocak examines the influence of history, 
memory, and travel on identity, the exclusive nature of networks, the construction rather 
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than location of identity.88 An exploration of these themes will further illuminate the 
relationship between immigrants and the European Dream. 
Like Sascha Muteschem, his narrator and protagonist, Senocak has resisted being 
classified as a representative for any particular group. Sascha is a German-Jewish-Turkish 
writer who has returned to unified Berlin to write his first novel. His plan is interrupted 
and redirected by the deaths of his Jewish-German mother and Turkish father, and by their 
estate. Part of the estate is a silver box full of diaries which belonged to his Turkish 
grandfather. Although Sascha was always a little curious about the man and his mysterious 
suicide, he becomes preoccupied with him, his role in the Armenian deportations and 
genocide of 1915 and his death in 1936, and the implications this could have for the 
identity Sascha feels he lacks. Sascha’s interest in his family’s history is rather 
underdeveloped in the story, but it provides an effective vehicle for Senocak’s exploration 
of history and memory and their effects on individual identity. Sascha’s heritage as “the 
grandchild of victims and perpetrators” puts him in a unique position with regard to 
history; according to the author, it is history that eventually becomes the “real protagonist 
of the novel.”89 The novel is extremely complex, built on layers of history which may be 
remembered rather than lived through, or distilled through the memories of others, 
reaching from turn-of-the-century Turkey to Reunification.  
Sascha’s search for his identity is tied up in his search for his family history, but 
rather than becoming a detective story focused on the historic and personal events or the 
facts about his ancestors which culminated in him, the story often takes on a more active 
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89  Andreas Huyssen, "Diaspora and Nation: Migration Into Other Pasts," New German Critique.88 (2003): 
147, p. 160. 
 66 
and in some ways more productive guise as the construction of an identity. While Sascha 
shows little interest in any artifacts his parents may have left behind, he is fascinated by his 
grandfather’s diaries. But they were written in Turkish when Turkish was written with the 
Arabic alphabet and sometimes even transliterated into Cyrillic script, making them 
impossible for Sascha to read. Despite his intense curiosity about his grandfather, however, 
Sascha does not resort to a translator until almost the end of the novel. He seems to use 
the diaries as a prop for the construction of an identity based on an imagined family 
history. At the end of the novel, after moving into his first private apartment, Sascha feels 
ready to relate his grandfather’s story “...wie sie sich ereignet hat. Sie könnte ungefähr so 
enden.”90 The reader never really knows whether or how much of the end of the 
grandfather’s story is true, but it is true enough for Sascha.   
Senocak uses Sascha’s unique heritage and relative ignorance about his family’s 
history to convey how history and memory, both real and imagined, personal and cultural, 
function as a foundation for identity. Without a history, where does one begin? History 
allows a certain degree of categorization, and provides a point of entry into a network. 
Unfortunately, the conflicting aspects of Sascha’s heritage only offer access to mutually 
exclusive categories; he needs a story to explain how those categories produced him and to 
tell him how to reconcile them. If Gefährliche Verwandtschaft were a simpler work or 
perhaps a fairy tale, Sascha might discover some heroic act or dramatic love affair which 
caused a culture to be rejected or an identity thrown off, thus reconfiguring at least the 
victim/perpetrator equation of his heritage. But heritage is rarely that simple, and certainly 
not for Sascha. He perceives the apparently contradictory aspects of his heritage as a 
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 67 
balance that allows him to walk upright.91 What he lacks is a way to reconcile them in one 
identity. The chances of finding something to reconcile the Turkish with the Jewish with 
the German are slim, and it is perhaps this knowledge that drives Sascha to create the story 
himself.  
He arrives at this point after testing some approaches to identity. Sascha begins the 
story believing that belonging in Germany is regulated by money,92 which he has. But he 
does not feel as if he belongs. He is tempted by an exclusionary understanding of identity, 
that “wer oder was man ist, kann man sich nicht aussuchen, das entscheiden die anderen, 
die einen nicht zu sich zählen.”93 This attitude enjoyed a great deal of support in 
Hoyerswerda, for example, but it is not particularly useful to Sascha. This is because 
although he cannot choose who he is, he can decide to not count others as one of his 
group. He can, according to this idea, choose who may not identify with him. In a 
roundabout way, then, he can still choose with whom to identify, and this seems to be his 
problem in the first place. It is unproductive at best for Sascha’s identity to be reduced to 
groups from which he is excluded, because the groups he comes from would exclude one 
another, doing nothing to aide his search for identity. Sascha also finds himself forced to 
reject assimilation: for him, “assimiliert ist nur derjenige, der die Perspektiven, Urteile und 
Vorurteile des Assimilierenden ganz uebernimmt.94” But regardless of which dominant 
culture is being referred to, adopting its perspectives, judgments, and prejudices entails a 
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rejection of the perspectives, judgments, and prejudices of the other two thirds of his 
heritage.  
Sascha proves to be a seeker much like the central figures in Akin’s films. In Berlin, 
he notices that people around him “zunehmend Probleme hatten”95 with his lack of 
identity. His search for identity turns him back to his family’s history. This history was not 
discussed when he was young: his German-Jewish mother avoided discussing the 
Holocaust, how her family died, or how she survived; after his parents divorce, his father 
does not discuss much of anything with Sascha, let alone his history. It is worth noting that 
this void of family history, rather than personal history, is what Sascha feels he needs to fill 
to have an identity. His own life does not seem to be enough. In this sense, he faces the 
opposite problem of most second generation non-Germans. He does not have enough 
tradition, and lacks any family structure or network within which to really be embedded. 
His parents’ deaths signify the final dissolution of the last real network he has, as well as 
the loss of the only immediate access points to his family history. Why didn’t Sascha 
pursue his identity or conflicted heritage prior to his parents’ deaths? While some sort of 
imagined history seems to be the best if not the only way for Sascha to ease the conflict in 
his heritage, he cannot begin to construct his identity or to write the story that might 
reconcile his heritage with itself until he is the only point of access to that heritage. But the 
strategy he finds can be equated with the tactics Sibel and Cahit use: he travels.  
He travels to several different countries, and everywhere he goes, he seems to suffer 
from a variation of romanticizing the lost homeland: he romanticizes the place he lived last 
and is no longer as his home. It is losing it which makes it significant. In Berlin, his home 
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is the American Midwest, in America it was Munich, and so on. This tendency seems to 
parallel his interest in his family’s history once everyone who can tell him about it is gone. 
It is impossible to tell if or how embedded he was in his previous homes, but his 
relationship with his family’s history seems to be one of retrospective embeddedness. 
Sascha points out that especially in the period after reunification, identity is the closest 
thing to security available:96 it allows a person to compartmentalize himself and to belong 
to something. But his conflicted heritage prevents him from feeling as if he truly belongs to 
much of anything until it is lost. Only then is he able to readjust the memory of that place, 
network, or history, making it a part of himself while avoiding potential conflict. As 
Andreas Huyssen observes, Sascha’s skewed perception of home fits well with his uprooted 
(or even absent) and complex family history. Home, according to Huyssen, is the “territory 
and homogenous culture from which diasporic community has been displaced.”97 This 
territory and culture have to be maintained through memory or nostalgia to retain their 
positions as foundation of a cultural identity.98 Sascha’s family failed to maintain any of 
the territories or cultures from which they had been displaced through memory or 
nostalgia, at least not in any way that he was aware. In this way, Sascha was deprived of a 
foundation for cultural identity. His search for identity leads him to displace himself 
repeatedly in order to experience (or create) that memory and nostalgia that is home. 
Luckily, Sascha’s situation in reunified Berlin allows him, “die Stadt [zu] verlassen, ohne 
aus ihr wegzuziehen,”99 to displace himself and make the city home without having to go to 
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an altogether new city. He is creating his own foundation for identity, through his 
grandfather’s imagined story and the reconfiguration of territory and culture of Germany.  
 
Taken together, Akin’s films and Senocak’s novel reveal several aspects of minority life and 
multiculturalism which create problems for the European Dream. In Rifkin’s proposal, 
empathy is a sort of trump card which is primary to the other pillars of the dream, 
including the multiculturalism and preservation of cultural identity which he finds so 
important. One of the fundamental obstacles to this setup is evident in the works discussed 
above. Cultural identities are uneasy things; multicultural identities even more so. It is the 
conflict within the multicultural backgrounds of the protagonists which inspires the search 
for their identities. The preservation of a traditional cultural identity may require a certain 
rejection of a new, modern one. But if Rifkin’s definition of empathy stands, it is 
improbable at best that one could empathize with members of a distinctly different culture 
without on some level extending one’s identity to include some part of that culture. The 
characters in the texts discussed above experience the pull of tradition and the 
identification with a new culture in a variety of ways, most of which involve a sort of snap 
or revelation followed by an escape from the “new” culture to the old one, or from the 
location of the conflict to a presumably less complicated space. In theory, this ought to 
relieve the tensions between the two conflicting cultural identities. In Sascha’s case, the 
cultures he inherited conflict with one another more than with modernity, precluding any 
escape to any old countries. Instead, he escapes to a sort of “dead zone,” a place which is 
(re)constructing itself, and an apartment which he sees as a truly empty space within which 
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he can construct his own history. The characters in the texts discussed above seem to 
present more evidence for Ataturk and Akin’s opinion that every language, culture, and 
lifestyle is a person. But the belief that a language, culture, or lifestyle extends beyond a 
person to a category of people is the force behind the pressure to be categorized or to 
belong to something. Without that pressure, would these characters experience such 
conflict?    
One of the fundamental flaws in the extension of a culture to a category of people 
is that cultures are not static and categories are. Cultures are constantly shifting, migrating 
and changing with people.100 The belief that cultures (or histories, or identities) can be 
permanent and unchanging is a topic common in the integration debate, often tied to 
culturalist racism.101 The perception of culture as an unchanging category aides the 
perception of loss of that culture and with it, cultural identity, when the culture changes or 
shifts. The perception of loss is not restricted to minority or diasporic cultures, but is 
evident in majority cultures as well. It often inspires members of either to begin 
“safeguarding identity and fortifying their borders, thus ossifying the past and closing 
themselves off to alternative futures.”102 It would seem, then, that even in the case of 
basically equal integration, integration without a cultural hierarchy, the changing of a 
culture could easily be perceived as a loss.  
Because culture is a changing thing, cultural identity must be able to change with 
its source or risk becoming ossified. The characters discussed above face a complex 
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problem: they must reconcile conflicting sources of cultural identity without succumbing to 
the perception of loss that may accompany necessary adaptations of the source in order for 
it to help form a functional identity. This reconciliation must be performed repeatedly. 
Although Sascha, Cahit, and Sibel appear to be searching for their identities, they are 
actually searching for a way to translate the conflicting sources of their cultural identities 
into functional, cohesive identities. In addition, they are searching for a way to reconcile 
these composite identities with the networks through which they move. Their apparent 
failure to accomplish this kind of identity gymnastics is unsurprising, as is Sascha’s decision 
to construct an identity himself. This presents a new variation of the problem presented by 
multiculturalism for the European Dream. Multicultural identities, while increasingly 
common, occupy a variety of networks, but to embed oneself completely or authentically in 
any network seems increasingly unlikely. Instead, parts of identities may be embedded in 
certain networks.  
The implications of this partial embeddedness on the European Dream are difficult 
to pinpoint, but it is doubtful that it will aide Rifkin’s theory. For one thing, networks, 
especially economic networks, are based on trust and solidarity. It would seem difficult to 
inspire trust in or to have solidarity with someone whose identity is fragmented or who is 
only partially embedded in the network. After all, if only a part of an individual is 
embedded, we are not really all in this together. As Senocak’s work has shown, the 
influence of history, memory, and travel on identity serves both to change it and to enable 
its construction, as well as to prevent complete embeddedness in exclusive networks.  The 
exclusive nature of networks gives credence to the idea of partial embeddedness or multiple 
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identities as a strategy to achieve Rifkin’s conception of freedom and gain access to a 
variety of relationships and networks.  Exclusive networks also illuminate the value of 
construction of identity rather than location of identity within a network as a way to avoid 
the internal conflict which can arise when a cultural identity is drawn from mutually 
exclusive sources. 
 
Authentic Identity in Russendisko 
 
Much like Akin and Senocak, Vladimir Kaminer presents characters in Russendisko who are 
very likely struggling with conflicted identities. He writes as a sort of denizen of immigrant 
life in Berlin, granting his readers access to the difficulties of Vietnamese cigarette sellers, 
the ambitions of Russian professors, and even the private life of his German case worker at 
the employment office. However, he does not approach the conflict in the same manner 
used by Akin and Senocak. First of all, the conflicts and characters Kaminer describes are 
not fictional. Secondly, Kaminer writes satire. His sense of humor has made his work quite 
popular, but it is also what makes his critiques (especially of Germans) so effective. Because 
of this, an exploration of Kaminer’s work has the potential to reveal more about the 
relationship between immigrants and the European Dream, particularly with regard to 
issues of multiculturalism and network switching. As we shall see, these aspects of the 
European Dream seem especially evident in Kaminer’s observations on solidarity, 
authenticity, and reasons for immigrating. 
The manner in which Germany approaches its “Ausländerproblem” is perhaps one of 
the reasons for the solidarity among immigrants described by Kaminer. The immigrants he 
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describes seem preoccupied with finding ways to outsmart the German government and to 
otherwise take advantage of trusting native Germans.103 German government officials and 
authority figures are also the subject of frequent ridicule. Kaminer has experienced the 
frustration and the bureaucracy firsthand. After the Soviet Union collapsed, he was not 
issued a new Russian passport because he already lived in Berlin. He still has his Soviet 
passport, but to become German, he must first get a passport from an existing nation. One 
of the most common themes in his work is the perceived dichotomy between German and 
non-German; he gives several accounts of Germans and immigrants who seem to think that 
it matters only that one is not a native. In his essay Suleyman und Salieri, he observes that 
much of the public discourse on the subject of hostility toward foreigners  
 
…nichts [löst]. Plötzlich entsteht ein Gefühl der 
Zusammengehoerigkeit bei vielen, die nicht 
zusammengehoeren und früher vielleicht gar nichts 
voneinander wissen wollten – Araber, Juden, Chinesen, 
Türken – weil sie genau diese ‘Ausländer’ sind.104
 
Kaminer’s description of the solidarity (empathy or identification) among foreigners 
indicates that exclusion from a network can be just as formative as inclusion in it. In fact, 
the exclusion from the category of “native” has aided the creation of an umbrella 
“foreigner” network. Furthermore, the exchange of enlightened (dominant culture) 
opinions was unlikely to have included the opinions of the very foreigners who are being 
discussed. This attitude is an altered version of the ones presented by Akin and Senocak. 
While the native/foreigner dichotomy is certainly problematic for them, they focus much 
                                                 
103  Vladimir Kaminer, Russendisko (Germany: Goldmann, 2002) 191, p. 98. 
104 Kaminer, p. 73. 
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more on issues of specific networks and the difficulty of switching between them. However, 
the division between networks often falls along these lines. Although there were minorities 
in the Altona network in Gegen die Wand, the workings of that network seemed quite 
German. Perhaps switching networks would be easier when moving between two networks 
based on minority cultures rather than from a minority culture network to a network based 
on the dominant culture. Is the fact that Sibel was shifting from minority culture to 
dominant culture the reason for the perception of loss? If so, it may explain the defensive 
attitude toward the foundations of her cultural identity which inspire her to invoke the 
figure of a married Turkish woman – a sort of holy or incorruptible image, whose honor 
demands respect – when confronted by her German lover.  
What effect do the kinds of exclusionary attitudes reflected in Kaminer’s work have 
on the relationship between immigrants and the European Dream? Perhaps immigrants 
come to Europe in pursuit of the very European Dream Rifkin presents. It would seem that 
they would stand a better chance of achieving it within the immigrant community. 
Kaminer’s work is very much tied up in the pursuit and accessibility of a European dream, 
but it may not be the dream Rifkin describes. In Russendisko, there are only a few reasons 
cited for immigrating to Germany: money,105 curiosity,106 or because it is easier to reach 
than the United States.107 These motivations do not reflect the European Dream. They 
may even represent flight from the very principles which support Rifkin’s theory.  
                                                 
105 Kaminer, p. 120.  
106 Kaminer, p. 191. None of these, according to Kaminer, are considered particularly good answers to give 
when asked in an application for citizenship why one came to Germany. 
107 Kaminer, p. 12.  
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Furthermore, the nostalgic position toward socialism which Kaminer occasionally 
takes is problematic for the dream. This is the kind of nostalgia which is sometimes 
considered to be evidence of maintaining the foundations of one’s cultural identity, and 
which is often considered a threat to successful integration. While maintenance of cultural 
identity is desirable under Rifkin’s theory, this nostalgia functions much like Sascha’s sense 
of home. The most explicit example is “Deutschunterricht,” in which Kaminer describes his 
favorite German textbook, a Russian book from 1991 called Deutsches Deutsch zum 
Selberlernen. The book presents a comically idyllic picture of Soviet life: “Genosse Petrov ist 
ein Kollektivbauer. Genosse Petrov lernt Deutsch. Er ist fleissig. Diese Arbeit ist schwer 
aber interessant. Die Wohnung des Genossen Petrov ist gross und hell. Das Wetter ist 
immer gut.”108 Kaminer falls asleep reading Deutsches Deutsch, and dreams of standing on 
Berg Fichtelberg with Comrade Petrov and Karl Marx where “das Wetter ist gut, die Sicht 
ist klar.” 109  They speak in German, and Marx tells them about his beautiful apartment 
which is large and airy. This is happiness for everyone involved.110  The implications of this 
kind of nostalgia could go one of two ways. Either it shows that this kind of life is lost, and 
will remain lost in order to maintain the foundations of cultural identity, or it reflects the 
desire to return to a more socialist way of life. Unfortunately, if this way of life were 
reestablished (the European Dream achieved?), the foundation of cultural identity might 
shift to the culture which would be lost, and in which that identity now functions. 
Kaminer also addresses the multiculturalism which is so important and problematic 
for Rifkin’s European Dream. In his essay “Geschäftstarnungen,” he relates his naïve surprise 
                                                 
108 Kaminer, p.184. 
109 Kaminer, p. 184. 
110 Kaminer, p. 185 
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at discovering how immigrants play on stereotypes and expectations of various nationalities 
to improve business at their restaurants: Bulgarians pretending to be Turks, Greeks 
pretending to be Italian, Arabians pretending to be Greeks, a girl from Buriatia running a 
sushi bar owned by Jewish Americans, a Belgian running an African restaurant, etc. 
Kaminer’s anthropologist friend claims this is a fairly common practice because “Berlin ist 
zu vielfältig. Man muss die Lage nicht unnötig verkomplizieren.”111 Immigrants have 
learned to meet the (admittedly low) expectations of native Germans and, in some ways, 
one another. Perceived identity is as important as true identity, if not more so. What does 
it mean for the European Dream that minorities pretend to be different minorities? Is it 
true multiculturalism?  
First of all, the expectation of authenticity in a restaurant or any business related to 
a minority group reflects an unwillingness to allow thorough integration or acculturation. 
By tacitly rewarding authenticity, distinct cultural boundaries are encouraged, and it is 
clear that authenticity is rewarded: given a choice between Chinese food cooked by 
Chinese and Chinese food cooked by, say, Texans, it seems natural that one would choose 
the “real” Chinese food. Secondly, that immigrants adopt an ethnic “image” in order to 
maximize business implies that they are less interested in embeddedness, true 
multiculturalism, or other aspects of the European Dream than they are in profits. This 
situation seems to support the Bildzeitung conception of multiculturalism insofar as it 
reflects the importance of distinct boundaries. But it only illustrates the restrictive nature 
of those boundaries in that one should appear to be firmly within the boundaries of one 
culture or another, depending on what one is selling.  
                                                 
111 Kaminer, p. 98. 
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 It is therefore interesting to note that Kaminer’s books and essays are extremely 
popular, and the Russendisko event, a party at Café Burger which Kaminer hosts a few times 
a year, has achieved cult status, attracting not only huge numbers of Russians and other 
immigrants, but Germans, Americans, and even Japanese tourists. Despite all his insights 
on German society and culture, and his access to such a wide variety of relationships 
(especially among other immigrants) which point to empathy and identification to some 
degree with all his subjects, Kaminer remains within the boundaries of the labels he carries: 
he is a Russian writer, an immigrant writer, etc. He does not (at least not in his essays) 
seem to have serious doubts about his identity.  
It is important to note that Kaminer’s lack of identity conflict does not correspond 
to the hollowness evident in characters like Sascha in the early chapters of Gefährliche 
Verwandtschaft. How does he manage to avoid the kind of identity crisis experienced by the 
figures Akin and Senocak describe? Several key differences between Kaminer’s approach to 
identity and the strategies employed by Akin, Senocak, and their characters reveal two sides 
of the same coin. First of all, Kaminer refuses to take identity, his own or anyone else’s, too 
seriously. He seems secure in his identity, and does not question or mourn any changes 
which may occur from exposure to other cultures. Secondly, he is not attempting to take 
on any part of German identity. He does not actively pursue embeddedness in German 
networks, or really, anywhere. He subverts the hierarchy of cultures by refusing to place the 
German cultural network as the object of his ambition, in a position which may require 
him to abandon other networks. Thirdly, Kaminer presents no threat to German cultural 
networks. He himself is not in Germany because of economic ambition. He does not 
 79 
demand or even request that the dominant culture change. Even if the belief that a 
network can accommodate a finite number of members is flawed, the fact that Kaminer 
does not appear to want one of these spots also aides the perception of the author as the 
embodiment of a harmless foreigner. This perception is further encouraged by the simple 
fact that his identity seems authentic and cohesive.   
Kaminer fills a position which Rifkin does not address in his construction of the 
European Dream. The dream is, naturally, not something which is already in place. But to 
arrive at it, or even to move toward a realization of it, requires a way to move beyond a 
divisive, either-or understanding of cultural networks. Because he appears non-threatening 
to the dominant culture, and has access to such a wide variety of immigrant networks, 
Kaminer’s work can help open avenues of communication between networks which rarely 
converse. Furthermore, Kaminer does not reinforce the existing cultural hierarchy in his 
work. Regardless of how much Akin and Senocak problematize the power structure 
between various networks, by depicting movement from minority to majority cultural 
networks, they tend to highlight the position of the dominant culture (the modern, or, 
bluntly, the German) as the desirable network. Kaminer, on the other hand, is able to 
show a variety of target networks. He even tells the story of a German trying to find his way 
into the dominant cultural network in Russia.  
Kaminer’s work represents a new approach to cultural conflict and identity. His 
non-threatening, satirical critiques of cultural mechanisms and his subversion of the 
cultural hierarchy presents a third way to approach the European Dream, beyond the 
confrontational, provocative approaches of van Gogh and the radicals of Hoyerswerda and 
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beyond the more pacifist internal struggles to define individual identity in the face of 
exclusive cultural networks presented by Akin and Senocak. Van Gogh, for example, 
wanted to change society. The characters in works by Akin and Senocak wanted to change 
themselves. Both of these approaches inspire defensive attitudes because change is often 
equated with loss. But Kaminer is non-threatening; while he does not ignore conflicts, or 
the need for change, he does not request or demand it on a personal or social level. His 
observations of a variety of networks are accessible to a diverse audience, and his humor 
leaves his audience to draw their own conclusions about if or what kind of change is 
required.  
 
The cultural artifacts discussed in this chapter have presented the European Dream with 
what seems to be a multitude of problems. Akin’s films illuminate the fundamental issue of 
mutually exclusive networks and sources of cultural identity. Senocak’s work brings the 
idea of mythologized history and constructed memory as the foundation for a constructed 
identity to the apparent conflict between various cultural identities and modern networks. 
Kaminer’s work is most helpful in its dethroning of the dominant culture as a target 
network, revealing the potential for a community of networks which are regarded as equal 
on the cultural hierarchy.  
While these works suggest a variety of strategies for coping with conflicted identity 
and network relations, it does not appear to be enough to overcome the obstacles they 
present to Rifkin’s conception of the European Dream. First and foremost, they raise the 
obstacle of authenticity. This seems quite necessary to achieve the trust and solidarity upon 
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which Rifkin claims networks are based. However, authentic identity, especially when 
drawn from conflicting cultural backgrounds, may not be granted access to some networks. 
Either access to a variety of networks or complete and authentic identity must be 
compromised. This basic conflict shakes the foundation of Rifkin’s theory of network 
economy and society. It is further weakened by the evidence given that preservation of 
cultural identity conflicts with free movement through networks, as well as with true 
multiculturalism.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
The exploration of the culturally traumatic events and the cultural artifacts discussed in 
previous chapters has raised a variety of questions which lead us to doubt the relevance of 
Rifkin’s theory of the European Dream to those allegedly pursuing it. At best, the fallout 
from the murder of Theo van Gogh and the violence in Hoyerswerda in the months 
following reunification point to a shift in focus for European consciousness. The values of 
the European Dream can be recognized in the social and political development prior to 
such events. It is precisely the commitment to multiculturalism, accessible education, 
minority rights, and other Rifkin-esque values which made the Netherlands such a bastion 
of tolerance and liberalism, and made the van Gogh murder all the more shocking. And 
while these values were not the driving force behind reunification, neither were they 
completely absent from the rhetoric or the efforts of the event. The fact that such acts of 
violence as the riots in Hoyerswerda and the murder of Theo van Gogh occurred in the 
face of such progress indicates that not everyone was buying into the European Dream. 
The reactions to those events in the media reflected the unforeseen difficulty in reconciling 
such contradictory goals as tolerance, multiculturalism, and assimilation. Public 
commentary also supports the conclusion that the values of the European Dream were 
losing ground in the face of such obstacles among many permanent and less-than-
permanent residents.   
 The texts produced by minority or immigrant authors reveal a similar disinterest or 
lack of commitment to the European Dream on the part of non-Europeans. In stark 
contrast to the American Dream, which is seen as a primary motivation for immigrants to 
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the United States, pursuit of the European Dream Rifkin presents is usually not a reason 
for immigrating to Europe. These immigrant texts also illuminate several obstacles standing 
in the way of actual achievement of the European Dream which may be the reason behind 
such disinterest. These include issues of authenticity, exclusive networks, conflicting 
sources of cultural identity, the constant shifting of cultural and network boundaries, and 
most of all accessibility.  
 One of the most primary flaws to the system Rifkin proposes is the contradictory 
relationship between the values of inclusiveness, solidarity, embeddedness, and universal 
human rights on the one hand; and preservation of cultural identity on the other. As 
evidenced in the reactions to the Hoyerswerda riots and the van Gogh murder, the 
preservation of cultural identity may be valuable in principle, but for many, it is seen as 
valuable only within the confines of the value system and the rights dictated by the 
dominant culture. The Dutch, for example, do see cultural diversity as important, but only 
as long as the diverse cultures in question can exist within and respect the values and 
boundaries – including equality, freedom of speech, etc. – of the Netherlands’ dominant 
culture. Even to the extent that a limited participation in the European Dream is 
envisioned as possible for non-Europeans, the texts by Akin, Senocak, and Kaminer have 
pointed to a problematic correlation between buying into the European dream and buying 
into the dominant cultural network. These works show that restrictive attitude to be a 
major difficulty because it entails identification with that dominant culture.  
 This belief that a pursuit of the European Dream necessarily entails a pursuit of 
European identity is one of the most prominent stumbling blocks for the dream. Is the 
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European Dream only accessible from within European identity, thought, or history? As I 
have shown, gaining access to or embedding oneself in a network entails empathizing with 
members of that network. And since empathizing, according to Rifkin, requires a certain 
identification with the recipient of the empathy, it is reasonable to draw a connection 
between pursuing the European Dream and pursuing a European identity. This 
identification, in turn, threatens the authenticity of identity by forcing a choice between 
adapting one’s identity to one’s present network and reconciling the different aspects of 
one’s identity (or the various network-anchored identities) with one another. Considering 
the distance and animosity between certain cultural networks, as shown in Senocak’s work, 
chances of successful reconciliation may be slim. But to switch identities with networks 
would seem to diminish the trust upon which the network system is based. Neither of 
these options quite satisfies the deathbed test, the “power to experience the full potential 
of one’s being in the world,”112 which Rifkin uses to show the superiority of the European 
freedom ideal.   
 So how could native Germans work around the issues raised by minority or 
immigrant texts? Since they already occupy the dominant culture, it would seem impossible 
for them to choose their own cultural network as a target network. But in many ways, they 
have. This is reflected in the implied superiority of European thought, values, and indeed, 
the European Dream. Movement between networks seems to be headed in one linear 
direction, from minority to majority. Do Europeans switch out of their dominant network? 
While the texts discussed in this paper do not explicitly address this question, the minority 
networks depicted do not seem to have been the target of anyone trying to switch out of 
                                                 
112 Rifkin, Dream, p. 192. 
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the majority network. This indicates that such network switching is rare. The real problem 
may lie in the fact that while the rhetoric surrounding cultural conflict often denies the 
existence of a cultural hierarchy, the exclusionary behaviors regulating the dominant 
cultural network reinforce it. Is it really an acceptance of this unmentionable hierarchy that 
the dominant culture is requiring when it insists on an acceptance of certain values?  
 As long as this contradictory stance is perpetuated, the authenticity of the 
European Dream would be undermined by members of the dominant cultural network 
saying one thing and doing another. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that 
the dominant cultural network has shown itself to be so interested in enforcing the 
boundaries of minority cultures through propagation of stereotypes or by co-opting 
positions of moral authority. This interest is most clearly reflected in actress Sibel Kekilli’s 
experience with the Bildzeitung crusade after her work in pornographic films was publicized. 
The Bildzeitung took on the moral outrage and public shaming that one would expect to 
hear from a conservative Muslim. Although this may seem to reflect identification with a 
minority network, it really does nothing but reinforce the boundaries of that minority 
network through pressure from the outside.   
 The attitude that the dominant cultural network often takes in defining minority 
networks and in regulating access seems both patronizing and disconnected with regard to 
immigrants. It presumes that non-Europeans would naturally want to come to Europe, take 
on European values, and embed themselves in European networks without appearing to 
consider alternative motives. This presumptuous attitude is also reflected in Rifkin’s work, 
reminding us of his own position in a dominant culture. His synthesis of the goals 
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Europeans are pursuing are only partially reflected in European reality. It seems likely that 
his theory is otherwise drawn from his own disillusionment with the American Dream and 
from his position within another dominant cultural network which allows him to see the 
best way for Europeans (and eventually everyone) to live. This perspective is remarkably 
similar to the problematic attitude taken by the dominant network in Germany (the 
Bildzeitung in particular) toward minority cultural networks: Rifkin seems to take on a voice 
of authority which reinforces stereotypes and defines the boundaries of European culture 
from the outside.  
 
It seems that the European Dream proposed by Rifkin suffers too much from internal 
contradictions and an unawareness of certain realities (particularly cultural hierarchies) to 
be truly viable, even as a dream. Furthermore, the evidence presented in this paper 
indicates that what appeal the dream does have is not enough that Europeans or 
immigrants are working toward it. By revealing such obstacles to the European Dream, 
these texts also provide potential solutions. These solutions, such as those produced by the 
earlier examination of Kaminer’s work, are certainly not the silver bullet for the theory’s 
flaws. But they do point to certain changes which could make the European Dream more 
accessible to immigrants and more feasible as a whole. This thesis has concentrated on the 
problems facing Rifkin’s proposal, and to explore alternative visions of that dream would 
entail a whole new analysis. At this point, all I can do is point very briefly at some of the 
hints that have turned up in the last pages indicating the direction such an analysis would 
take. 
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 The problem of fundamental differences between a target culture and a primary 
culture (or source culture, the culture from which an individual moves toward the target 
culture) has been an especially difficult obstacle for European society for decades. This 
study of Rifkin’s theory has brought to light the difficulty of accessing the accompanying 
networks. Efforts to gain access to a dominant cultural network may be restricted by 
exclusionary tactics of the dominant culture. As Akin and Senocak in particular have 
shown, the sort of identity crisis which can result from trying to move between those 
fundamentally different networks can be exceptionally destructive, and often ends in some 
degree of rejection of both networks.  Kaminer comes closest to providing a solution to the 
problem, which he accomplishes by refraining from making dominant German culture a 
target cultural network at all. 
 The difficulty of accessing the dominant cultural network experienced by 
immigrants and minorities in Europe raises the issue of whether the European Dream is 
necessarily located within the dominant cultural network. As reflected in Kaminer’s work 
especially, the European Dream as Rifkin proposes entails accessing the dominant cultural 
network. However, there remains the possibility of a dream which extends beyond 
boundaries or value systems of a particular network.  
 These issues are central to an analysis of Rifkin’s theory because they may also 
stand in the way of native Europeans. Especially in light of advancing globalization, Rifkin 
points out, the likelihood of an identity restricted to one network is minimal at best. The 
problem of ‘multiple networks’ and conflicting allegiances is not just one faced by 
immigrants; rather, it is a universal problem in the modern age. So, the Europeans may in 
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fact have something to learn from the immigrants and from their rejection of the European 
Dream. Problems of conflicting networks have been restricted to immigrant and minority 
experiences until now, but they will be shared by Europeans themselves, not just in their 
dealings with immigrants, but in their own “European” world itself. Judging by the 
frequency of exposure to and interaction with cultures not our own, and again relying on 
Rifkin’s definition of empathy and identification, even exclusive networks would be made 
up of individuals who identify with other networks as well. This identification with 
minority cultural networks ought to aide in subverting or even eliminating the linear 
cultural hierarchy which was so problematic for Rifkin’s theory.  
 The minority and immigrant texts discussed previously show that there are 
alternative motives for relocation to Europe, as well as alternative means to pursuing those 
motives, which do not necessarily involve dominant cultural networks. While the European 
Dream seems to require at least some acceptance of European values, there is perhaps a 
dream which does not. Kaminer, for one, appears to be quite satisfied in his pursuit of a 
European dream without looking for it in the dominant network.  
Easing the difficulties involved in navigating a multiplicity of networks, however, may not 
solve the problem of the location of the European Dream. Would doing away with the 
present cultural hierarchy mean that the dream could be housed in any number of 
networks? It seems more likely that without a hierarchy to structure the pursuit of a dream, 
or to press various conceptions of the dream into a single mold, various networks may 
develop various conceptions of that dream. Given the preceding discussion, two potential 
 89 
solutions to the problem of the European Dream being definitively located within any 
particular network are particularly interesting. 
 The idea that a dream could be specific to a network is initially appealing. It avoids 
issues of hierarchy and compromised cultural identity. But given the multiple networks 
with which individuals may identify, network level dreams lead to dreams on the level of 
the individual. And just as Ataturk's reduction of language and culture to the individual 
makes the concepts of language and culture less useful, the reduction of a dream to the 
level of the individual does not fit with our understanding of a dream as an idea that has 
broad appeal and moves large numbers of people. However possible a plurality of dreams at 
the network level may prove to be, this leads to the more likely possibility of there being no 
dream at all. Alternatively, however, there could be a single dream, toward which members 
of those various networks are in fact working but which is colored or shaped for them by 
the lens of each specific network. If this were so, then the different networks with which 
one identifies would give each individual a different perspective on that dream, as well as 
an awareness of the particularity, the “localness” of that variation of the dream.  
 Optimistic as it may seem, this conception of a dream satisfies the requirement that 
a dream has broad appeal and moves large numbers of people. As mentioned earlier, an 
analysis of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper, but this does show that, 
flawed as Rifkin’s particular theory might be, the potential for a European Dream remains.  
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